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We conduct separate randomized controlled trials of norm-based feedback nudges on house-
hold waste in two municipalities in western Sweden. Our main treatment presents recipi-
ents with accurate, household-specific feedback highly similar to the standard Home Energy
Report design, but with residual (unsorted) waste as the object of comparison. We also
test a novel ‘dynamic’ norm design informed by psychological research. Post-experimental
reductions are on the order of 7-12% in both municipalities, substantially larger than in
most previous studies. We estimate that the reduction corresponds to a 30-60% increase
in unit-based waste fees. Effect differences between our main treatment and the dynamic-
norm treatment are not significant. We find that feedback nudges are highly cost-effective
compared to alternative means for reducing household residual waste. However, net social
benefits depend on whether existing waste fees internalize the marginal social cost of residual
waste. Our results have implications for the usefulness of feedback interventions as well as
for unit-based pricing of waste, on which our feedback materials rely.
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1 Introduction
Large-scale interventions promoting household resource conservation through norm-based
feedback have become a mainstay of applied behavioral economics over the past decade.2 The
most well-known example of such a norm-based intervention is the ‘Home Energy Report’
(HER) developed by Opower and mailed to households across the United States (see e.g.,
Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2012; Costa and Kahn, 2013). HERs present household-specific
feedback on energy use compared to a set of similar neighbors, and includes both injunctive
(‘ought’) and descriptive (‘is’) norm components.
Effects from norm feedback interventions appear to systematically differ in size across
contexts and domains. Feedback on water use appears to drive reductions of about 5%
in receiving households (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Bernedo et al., 2014; Jaime Torres and
Carlsson, 2018). Effect sizes for electricity use are generally smaller: in an analysis of over
100 different large-scale HER experiments in the US, Allcott (2015) finds average reductions
of 1.31%, with a standard deviation of 0.45 percentage points. Given the documented range
of effects, there has recently been some debate on the value and cost-effectiveness of feedback
interventions in different settings.3 Our paper adds to that discussion by applying the HER
paradigm in a novel domain: household waste. We are aware of no other study that tests
the large-scale impact of household-level norm feedback on waste.
It seems plausible that the range of observed effect sizes reflects differences in how much
cost and effort is required to reduce usage. If so, there is good reason to expect larger
effects from feedback on waste than on either electricity or water use. According the 2015
Residential Energy Consumption Survey of the US Energy Information Administration,4
the bulk of home electricity use is for air conditioning, refrigerators, and space and water
heating, with only about 10% due to lighting. Making deep cuts in household electricity use
thus involves either high-effort behavior change such as turning down the heat in winter, or
2The rapidly growing literature, starting from Schultz et al. (2007), now includes a large number of
studies evaluating specific designs (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2012; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and
Price, 2013; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015; Jaime Torres and Carlsson, 2018; Holladay et al., 2019; Brülisauer
et al., 2020), as well as long-run effects (Ferraro et al., 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Bernedo et al., 2014),
welfare implications (Allcott and Kessler, 2019), and psychological mechanisms (Alberts et al., 2016; Byrne
et al., 2018).
3In particular, Andor et al. (2020) has recently argued that the relative success of HER in the US may
be limited to that setting. Allcott (2011) estimates that, for effect sizes of about 1-3%, the Opower HERs
are cost-effective per unit of carbon emissions compared to other energy conservation policies. By contrast,
Andor et al. (2020) replicate the HER design in Germany and observe a substantially smaller treatment effect
of 0.7%. Since baseline per-capita electricity consumption is higher in the US than in other OECD countries,
the authors conclude that norm-based feedback is unlikely to be cost-effective outside of the United States.
4https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/index.php.
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costly physical capital investments. Allcott and Rogers (2014) observe that few households
respond to feedback by buying energy efficient appliances, suggesting limited scope for low-
cost behavior change. A similar, but less stark pattern seems likely to hold for water use
(Bernedo et al., 2014). By contrast, reducing unsorted waste normally requires little in the
way of physical capital investment beyond buying a set of in-home recycling bins. Unlike for
electricity or water, this physical capital is largely a complement rather than a substitute
with effort (Vollaard and van Soest, 2020).5 Even so, the marginal effort of increasingly
diligent recycling seems less steep compared to reductions in other domains, and household
waste may thus represent an upper bound on what HER-style feedback can achieve.
Our results are consistent with these points. We run separate large-scale experiments in
two municipalities in western Sweden. Randomizing treatment across nearly all single-family
homes in both localities, we send treated households repeated and accurate feedback, pre-
sented in a HER-style format, on the amount of residual waste (in kg/person) they generate
compared to neighbors.6 We focus on residual waste rather than recycling rates to allow
for waste prevention, for example by buying less packaging-intensive consumer products. In
both experiments, high-precision average treatment effect (ATE) estimates show that the
residual-waste weights of treated addresses drop after receiving the first letter.
Notably, reductions are about 7-12%, depending on the exact regression specification:
considerably larger than in previous studies of norm-based feedback. In fact, the reduction
is about the same magnitude as in a recent study by Vollaard and van Soest (2020) on
a Dutch crackdown on incorrect sorting involving both fines and salient bin inspections.
In principle, the effect we observe may be driven by any combination of waste prevention,
increased recycling, and illicit disposal (dumping). When examining mechanisms, we find
no evidence that treatment increases illicit disposal. Thus, given that our main treatment
replicates the standard HER format, our results confirm that effects from feedback do indeed
vary strongly across domains; moreover, it suggests that norm-based interventions may be
deployed as effective non-price instruments to reduce unsorted waste.
Both participating municipalities have pre-existing systems for unit-based pricing (UBP)
of waste (weight-based fees). Indeed, our particular design is explicitly tailored to such
5Exceptions involving substitutability with effort do exist and tend to involve actions to prevent waste,
e.g., by placing a ‘no ads’ sticker on one’s mailbox.
6Throughout this paper, the term residual waste is used for the unsorted fraction of household waste,
which is typically incinerated in most OECD countries (including Sweden). Similarly, what we term food
waste is the biodegradable fraction collected by utilities, which differs from wasted food in that not all food
waste is avoidable.
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pricing schemes: our partner utilities routinely weigh each bin during collection, and feedback
letters are constructed from the resulting weight data. As a result, our study also relates
to the ongoing examination of marginal-cost pricing of waste, also known as ‘pay-as-you-
throw’.7
As in the case of energy or water, utilities may be reluctant to raise marginal costs further,
e.g. because of acceptance concerns. Additionally, there is some worry that higher prices
per unit will lead to increased dumping of waste (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Heller and
Vatn, 2017) or leakage to unregulated areas (‘waste tourism’; see e.g., Bucciol et al., 2015),
though the weight of the empirical evidence suggests such perverse effects on disposal are
small to nonexistent (Allers and Hoeben, 2010; Carattini et al., 2018; Bueno and Valente,
2019; Erhardt, 2019; Valente, 2020). Nevertheless, non-price policies may prove more readily
implementable than further increases in the per-unit price facing households.8 Conversely,
the fact that there is unique potential to add norm-based interventions on top of pay-as-you-
throw schemes implies that UBP may hold greater promise than has yet been recognized.
We estimate that unit-based fees need to increase by 32-60% to produce effects of similar
size to our main ATEs. Thus, norm feedback appears highly effective even compared with
economic incentives.
Feedback is also very cost-effective compared to other non-price waste policies such as
curbside collection of packaging. Impacts on social welfare are more mixed: in one of the
two municipalities, we find that existing unit-based fees already account for most social costs
of waste disposal, so net benefits from feedback are unsurprisingly negative. By contrast,
marginal fees are lower in the other municipality, implying generally positive net social
benefits of up to about $20 per household. Thus, feedback nudges stand out as efficient
second-best policy for areas where pre-existing marginal incentives do not (fully) reflect
7Early studies of UBP have attempted to identify the causal effect of such schemes on waste generation
and recycling by making before-after comparisons (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996), exploiting cross-sectional
variation (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000), or both (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2009). More recently, several
studies have used a regression difference-in-differences approach with unit (e.g., municipality) fixed effects
(Allers and Hoeben, 2010; Usui and Takeuchi, 2014; Bucciol et al., 2015; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2017; Carat-
tini et al., 2018). Bueno and Valente (2019), arguably the current ‘state of the art’ in the UBP literature,
uses a synthetic-control strategy that appears to better model unobserved heterogeneity than fixed-effects
approaches do. Finally, some studies have also used complementary IV approaches to control for endogenous
policy (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000; Allers and Hoeben, 2010; Huang et al., 2011).
8In line with this point, several authors have noted that recycling efforts appear strongly driven by
intrinsic motivation, in addition to material concerns (e.g., Sterner and Bartelings, 1999; Berglund, 2006;
Kipperberg, 2007; Ferrara and Missios, 2012; Czajkowski et al., 2017). Interestingly, Viscusi et al. (2011)
question the importance of social norms for waste behavior, arguing that private values are crucial; in
contrast, our results would seem to confirm that waste behavior is strongly driven by norm-related concerns.
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marginal social costs. At the end of this paper, we also discuss potentials for applying waste
feedback in areas without any unit-based pricing.
A final contribution of our study is that, in one of the two experiments, we test not only
the standard HER feedback format but also a novel design that stresses how resource use in a
household’s comparison group changes over time. Recent evidence in Sparkman and Walton
(2017) and Mortensen et al. (2019) suggests that such ‘dynamic’ or ‘trending’ norms are
more effective at changing behavior. They argue that, compared with snapshot information
stressing cross-sectional variation, presenting respondents with ongoing changes provides a
stronger signal that behavioral costs and benefits are shifting in the population as a whole.
Thus, respondents may be more inclined to respond by updating their view of the proper
course of action. We do identify substantial waste reductions also among households receiv-
ing dynamic-norm feedback. However, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from the
standard HER design: thus, we find no evidence that dynamic-norm feedback interventions
are more effective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some brief
institutional background on waste management in Sweden. Section 3 outlines our experi-
mental design, while Section 4 describes our empirical strategy as well as some important
features of the data. Section 5 presents main results. Section 6 then moves on to various
extensions, analyzing mechanisms (illicit disposal, prevention, recycling), treatment-effect
heterogeneity, the effect of injunctive labeling, and long-run effects. Section 7 evaluates the
costs, benefits, and cost-effectiveness of norm feedback on household waste. Finally, Section
8 concludes the paper.
2 Waste management in Sweden
Swedish national targets for waste management largely derive from EU objectives, with
the 2018 revision of the EU Waste Framework Directive requiring each members state to
recycle 50% of household waste by 2020. Additional targets construct a trajectory where
recycling targets increase by five percentage points every five years, up to 65% in 2035. The
overall Swedish recycling rate stood at 57% in 2018, so the 2020 target is being met, though
additional policies are needed to attain later targets. There are also more specific Swedish
targets for packaging, paper, and food-waste recycling, not all of which are currently being
met (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2020).
Local waste management rests on a dual system. First, collection and treatment of
residual and food waste is left to municipalities, typically being run by local utilities. Some
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localities have opted for curbside collection and/or unit-based pricing to encourage household
recycling; the latter is in use in about 10% of Swedish municipalities. Second, packaging and
paper are subject to extended producer responsibility regulations. Collection from single-
family homes (the focus of our study) occurs mainly through some 5,000 designated ‘recycling
stations’ where households may go to drop off packaging and paper waste. All stations are
run by a single producer-owned corporation, FTI.9
Our experiments were conducted in Varberg and Partille, two municipalities in southwest
Sweden. Both have used weight-based waste fees since the 1990s, and neither collects residual
or food waste curbside. In both municipalities, waste fees have a fixed as well as a per-unit
component. The marginal-cost component remained constant throughout 2019, the year
of our intervention; in Partille, it equalled approximately $0.20 per kg in USD terms, for
both residual and food waste, while it was about $0.34 in Varberg. Varberg additionally
requires households that do not source separate food waste to pay a per-unit surcharge,
roughly doubling the per-unit price. In both areas, the variable cost component is displayed
separately on all utility bills received by households.
3 Experimental design
We conduct a pair of separate but parallel studies in the Swedish municipalities of Varberg
and Partille. In each locality, our study sample includes about 90% of all single-family homes;
since household-specific waste weights cannot be identified in apartment buildings, no such
addresses are part of either study. This leaves us with about 15,000 households in Varberg
and 5,000 in Partille.
In both areas, households are divided roughly equally into three treatment arms, including
a control group; however, the two treatments differ across municipalities, as shown in Table
1. All experimental interventions involve letters containing accurate and household-specific
norm feedback on residual waste. These letters, stamped with the relevant municipal logo,
are sent repeatedly to all treatment-group households. Both interventions took place during
March-October 2019, with the first letters received on 19 March in all groups.10
Households in either control condition do not receive feedback letters. As for treatments,
first, the Varberg study varies the feedback type used. We attempt to go beyond stan-
9Citing dissatisfaction with how the recycling stations are managed, some municipalities now offer curb-
side collection of packaging and paper in addition to residual and food waste. The two municipalities we
study do not, however.
10There is variation of up to one day around all receiving dates because of limitations in the delivery
capacity of the Swedish postal service.
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Municipality Treatment N
Varberg 1. Control : no letters sent 4,971
2. Static: monthly norm-based feedback 4,961
3. Dynamic: monthly norm-based feedback 5,003
Partille 1. Control : no letters sent 1,837
2. Monthly : ‘static’ norm-based feedback 1,838
3. Quarterly : ‘static’ norm-based feedback 1,844
Notes: Table lists treatment conditions in the two studies. For each treatment, the final column
reports how many addresses are included in our main data sets.
Table 1: Experimental treatments in the two studies
dard HER-type feedback designs emphasizing cross-sectional comparisons between house-
holds (‘static’) to instead highlight how waste behavior has changed since the last letter
was received (‘dynamic’). In Partille, all households receive static feedback, and we in-
stead vary feedback frequency, with one treatment group receiving feedback every four weeks
(‘monthly’), and the other receiving feedback every twelve weeks (‘quarterly’). Households in
the ‘monthly’ condition receive a total of nine feedback letters between March and October
2019, while households in the ‘quarterly’ condition receive three feedback letters.
Figure 1 provides an example, translated from Swedish, of the ‘static’ feedback presented
to households in Varberg. The setup is very similar to previous studies on HERs such
as Allcott and Rogers (2014) or Andor et al. (2020). In monthly conditions, each letter
refers specifically to the preceding four weeks; in the quarterly condition, reference periods
are the past twelve weeks. For each such period, the bar chart in the upper part of the
page displays, top to bottom: (i) the receiving household’s summed residual-waste weights
per person; (ii) average summed per-person weights within a reference group of roughly 100
households belonging to the same treatment arm; and (iii) average per-person weights within
the subset of ‘waste efficient’ neighbors, i.e., households in the bottom 20 percentiles of the
reference-period specific weight distribution.11
Following standard practice, we add an injunctive component to the bar chart, with the
11Other studies have made the comparison with the 20th percentile instead; we believe the average is
easier to explain. A second difference is that we did not include information on potential monetary savings.
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Figure 1: Translated example of a static-norm feedback letter
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aim of counteracting ‘boomerang effects’, i.e., that efficient households reduce their efforts at
the same time that inefficient households increase them (Schultz et al., 2007). Below the bar
chart, a summary box with three possible outcomes is displayed. First, if a household’s weight
is above the reference-group average, the assessment ‘Room for improvement’ is displayed,
with the other two outcomes greyed out. For weights below the reference average but above
the efficient average, ‘Good’ is displayed instead, along with one smiling emoticon. Finally, if
the weight falls below even the efficient average, ‘Great’ is displayed along with two smileys.
The lower graph shows the evolution of own-household weights as well as reference and
efficient averages over the past twelve months. Like the upper chart, this time series is
updated with each additional feedback letter. Finally, at the bottom of the page is a link to
a municipal web page with more information, including some ‘frequently asked questions’. A
translated version of such an FAQ section may be found in Appendix A.1.12 Recipients are
also informed that the FAQ web page includes a service where they may opt out of receiving
letters in the future. Households that do so receive no further feedback letters during the
entire intervention period.
By the end of the project, 1,466 households had opted out in Varberg, while 189 house-
holds had done so in Partille. These figures amount to 14.6% and 5.1% of treated households,
respectively; by comparison, in studies of HERs, opt-out rates tend to be less than 1% on
average (Allcott, 2015). Some households are likely to view simply being exposed to the
letters as a utility cost (Allcott and Kessler, 2019); while not visible in our data, the high
opt-out rates we observe suggest the magnitude of such costs may be domain-specific, i.e.,
larger than for energy-use feedback. In any case, although households that opted out are
also not identifiable as such in our final data set, we do retain them in the sample, and thus
their decision not to participate does not bias our results in relation to actual policies with
similar opt-out rates.
Overall, few major differences exist between the static feedback received by households in
Partille and Varberg. The most substantial difference is that, due to municipality concerns
regarding public acceptance, households in Partille do not receive a textual evaluation of the
bar chart. Valenced feedback is reduced to the use of emoticons at the right end of the bar
chart, aligned with the upper (own-household) bar. The number of smileys is the same as in
Varberg, for example with one smiley displayed when the household weight lies between the
reference average and the efficient average. However, we do not grey out the set of possible
12Among other things, the FAQ section stresses that the letters are for information provision only and
that high-waste households will not face sanctions.
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assessments not given to a household.
Figure 2 shows a translated example of feedback in the dynamic condition, received only
by households in Varberg. Here, the time-series graph featured in the static feedback letter is
replaced with a centrally placed text box, which reports how waste weights have changed over
the immediately preceding four-week period. For households that have reduced their weight,
the share of neighbors with an even larger reduction is given. Households that increase their
waste weight from one period to another receive similar feedback, but with the sentence on
neighbor behavior reporting the proportion that have reduced their waste by any amount.
Thus, households are always provided with a relevant benchmark for comparison.
It is worth noting that ‘static’ letters do include a (dynamic) time series; likewise, even
in the ‘dynamic’ letters, the text-and-emoticon evaluation still refers to the (static) bar
chart. Thus, the static/dynamic dichotomy remains somewhat blurred as implemented in
our treatments. Compared to a static-norm design, our dynamic feedback nevertheless clearly
puts stronger emphasis on the period-to-period changes that are occurring in the reference
population (Sparkman and Walton, 2017; Mortensen et al., 2019).
Each feedback letter also includes text on the back, with general information on recycling
options in the recipient’s municipality as well as some specific tips on how to reduce waste
(e.g., by planning food purchases or putting a no-ads sticker on the mailbox). This page did
not change over the course of the experiment, although there was some variation across the
two municipalities. An example back page (for Varberg) is given in Appendix A.2.
We implement cluster randomization with blocking in both municipalities. The clus-
ters are geographically contiguous groups of addresses that are themselves organized into
larger blocks (also contiguous) of exactly three clusters each. Treatment status is perfectly
correlated within cluster and each treatment arm is present in all blocks. We use cluster
randomization to mitigate potential interference between treatment and control households,
which might arise if, for instance, immediate neighbors discuss the letters. Evidence of such
across-household spillovers is mixed in previous research (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Dolan
and Metcalfe, 2015; Jaime Torres and Carlsson, 2018). Although randomizing in clusters
reduces power to some extent, we prefer to err on the side of caution, not least since our ex-
periments apply norm feedback in a new domain. Furthermore, the use of blocking effectively
provides stratification by neighborhood, again increasing estimator precision.13
13Clusters and blocks were constructed ‘by hand’ with the explicit objective of sorting similar housing
types into the same blocks; for more information on our randomization methodology, see Appendix B.1.
Appendix C shows that our sample gives at least 80% power to detect a residual-waste reduction of about
2% (4%) in Varberg (Partille).
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Figure 2: Example of a dynamic-norm feedback letter
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The final feedback letter, sent in late October 2019, informed households that no more
letters would be sent and also included a link to an endline survey. The same information
was sent without feedback to addresses in the Partille quarterly condition (which had already
received feedback one month before) as well as control households, but not to households
that had opted out of the study. Survey items included questions regarding knowledge of and
attitudes to the project, waste behavior over the preceding months, as well as project-related
contacts with other households. Translated versions of the survey are found in Appendix
A.3.
4 Data and empirical strategy
Both participating municipalities have had pay-as-you-throw incentives in place prior
to the study period and thus weigh all waste bins during collection. The resulting weight
records form our main data source and were also used to construct accurate feedback let-
ters throughout the course of our intervention; for information on how this was done, see
Appendix B.2.
The raw waste data contain one line per bin-specific collection event, typically including
a non-zero weight measured in kilograms. We perform the following operations on these data
sets. First, we select all addresses that either received at least one feedback letter, or else are
flagged as part of a control cluster. This excludes, for example, a few hundred households
flagged as part of a treatment group that did not receive letters due to various exclusion
criteria (see Appendix B.2). Our final data set includes 14,935 households in Varberg, and
5,519 in Partille.
Second, the raw waste data involve three waste-bin types: food, household (residual),
and unsorted waste, where a household typically either has one food and one residual-waste
bin, or a single unsorted-waste bin.14 We recode weights associated with the latter pair of
waste fractions as a single residual-waste variable. All remaining operations described below
are then performed separately for residual and food waste.
Third, collection events may report an associated anomaly whenever, for example, a bin
is not placed curbside and thus cannot be collected. For certain such anomaly reports,
including when bar codes for bin identification are found to be faulty, we consider stated
14As noted in section 2, fractions such as paper and packaging waste are collected through separate
channels, in a parallel system based on extended producer responsibility. These fractions are not directly
targeted by our intervention, and additionally there is little high-resolution data on their collection. We will
return to these points in Section 6.1, where we consider treatment-effect mechanisms.
12
weights unreliable and recode them as missing. The exact recoding, which is identical to
that used when compiling feedback letters, is given in Appendix B.2.
Fourth, most (or, in Varberg, all) households have biweekly collection cycles, with collec-
tion from different households roughly evenly staggered across each two-week period. There-
fore, we organize our data as an address-by-two-week-period panel. The panel, starting on 19
March, 2018, includes 26 pre-experimental periods (t ≤ 0), and 18 post-experimental periods
(t ≥ 1). Thus, monthly feedback was received in periods 1, 3, 5, etc; and quarterly feedback
was received in periods 1, 7, and 13.15 To sum the weights within period, we use the fol-
lowing procedure. We first sum all events across individual days, by address and separately
for food and residual waste. In this step, missing weights that occur on the same day as a
non-missing weight are dropped from the data set, i.e., summed as zero weights. Then, we
sum the resulting day-specific weights across each two-week interval, again by address. Here,
any remaining missing values are summed as missing, implying that the two-week period
sum will also be missing.
Fifth, the summed weights are then divided by the number of household members as given
by register data from the Swedish Tax Authority. For addresses where the tax authority
data does not report any household members, values are imputed using the relevant 2019
municipality average for single-family homes from publically available Statistics Sweden data
(3.0 persons/household in Partille, 2.7 in Varberg). We are left with two household-level per-
capita outcome variables, for residual and food waste, respectively.
Sixth and finally, in accordance with our pre-analysis plan, certain observations and
addresses are considered outliers and are dropped from the data. Specifically, we exclude
(i) all households with an average residual or food-waste weight above 15 kg/person; (ii)
households with >90% missing or zero observations for both residual and food waste, across
all periods; and (iii) any single data point with residual or food-waste weight above 50
kg/person. In both municipalities, about 2% of remaining observations are dropped as a
result, nearly all of which are excluded due to condition (i) and (ii). Our results are robust
to retaining these observations.
Our main regression uses residual waste in kg per person as outcome variable, estimating






i + γXi + εijkt (1)
15The periods run from Monday to Sunday at the end of the following week, and do not coincide with
the four-week and twelve-week intervals used for feedback purposes, which always run from a Wednesday to
a Tuesday. For example, the initial set of monthly letters was compiled on 13 March, 2019 and covered the
period 13 February-12 March, which partially overlaps periods −2 to 0.
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where i, j, k and t index address, cluster, block, and time, respectively. Since we employ
cluster randomization, we consistently cluster robust standard errors at the cluster level
(Abadie et al., 2017). λkt are block by two-week period fixed effects, and Xi is a set of
predetermined address-level controls.
Equation (1) is an ANCOVA regression, replacing address fixed effects with ȳPREi , the
baseline (periods −25 to 0) average of residual-waste weights for household i. ANCOVA
can be viewed as an efficient convex combination of difference-in-differences and an ex-post
comparison of means across treatment arms. It yields weakly higher precision than either
component estimator, with efficiency gains compared to difference-in-differences increasing
as serial correlation approaches zero (McKenzie, 2012). ANCOVA regressions are run only
on post-treatment observations, allowing the treatment t subscript to be dropped. We ad-
ditionally exclude period 1, when households first received feedback, although we note that
results are robust to not doing so. Treatment-group variables T 1jt and T
2
jt are always equal
to zero for control clusters, and are equal to one in associated treated clusters throughout
periods 2-18.
5 Results
Figure 3 provides a first look at the experimental results. It tracks average per-person
residual-waste weights for each treatment arm and all periods, separately for Varberg (upper
panel) and Partille (lower panel). Vertical lines, placed between period 0 and 1, mark the
start of treatment.
To the extent that randomization has successfully eliminated average differences between
treated and non-treated units, each set of three lines should coincide throughout the pre-
treatment period. Reassuringly, this is clearly the case in Varberg despite some rather
pronounced seasonal effects.16 It is not so apparent in Partille, where treatment is randomized
over fewer clusters and outcome balance is correspondingly less likely. However, note that,
on either side of the dashed vertical line representing the start of treatment, the relative
position of each treatment-arm average is roughly constant over time. Thus, while pre-
treatment trends do not coincide, they do appear reasonably parallel, suggesting difference-
in-differences may be applied as a secondary identification strategy. We return to this point
below.
16Varberg is a popular domestic summer resort, explaining the peak around periods −18 to −15, at





















































Figure 3: Residual-waste averages by treatment arm and two-week period
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Next, to the extent that our interventions are effective, we would expect control and
treatment averages to diverge beyond each vertical line. Indeed, it seems that this is hap-
pening in both municipalities. In Varberg, from about period 1 onward, control averages are
consistently above treated averages, suggesting a residual-waste reduction of about the same
magnitude in both the static and dynamic feedback groups. In fact, since pre-treatment
trends essentially coincide, these average treatment effects will be roughly equal to the gap
between the lines, suggesting a reduction on the order of 0.25 kg/person in both condi-
tions. In relative terms, this is about 7% of the post-treatment control average of roughly
3.40 kg/person. The effect is substantially larger in magnitude than typically found in the
literature on Home Energy Reports (e.g., Allcott, 2011, 2015). In Partille, again applying
differences-in-differences reasoning, we note that control averages are slightly below monthly
and quarterly-group averages up until the start of treatment, and are consistently above
thereafter. That pattern again suggests a negative-sign treatment effect, although the mag-
nitude of the effect is less immediately clear than in Varberg.
Table 2 presents ANCOVA regression results. The regression in column 1 corresponds to
equation (1) absent covariate vector Xi, confirming a waste reduction of 0.2-0.25 kg/person
from both treatments in Varberg. At the bottom of the table, we also report p values for the
test that both treatment effects are equal in magnitude; clearly, this null hypothesis cannot
be rejected.
Then, in column 2, we add an additional set of household characteristics at baseline, i.e.,
immediately before the first letter was received. These are: (i) household size, (ii) age of
the oldest member of the household (termed head of household), (iii) gender of the oldest
member of the household, (iv) whether the household includes at least one child below five
years of age; (v) distance, in meters, to the nearest FTI recycling station; and (vi) whether the
household’s waste collection cycle is two weeks or not. In Partille, about 90% of households
in the data have two-week collection cycles, while in Varberg, the figure is exactly 100%,
so this covariate is not added there. Our results for Partille are robust to simply dropping
those households with collection cycles not equal to two weeks.
With added covariates, treatment-effect estimates are very similar to column 1, indeed
slightly larger at 0.25-0.3 kg/person. However, the sample is skewed due to missing covariate
data; when we run the regression specification of column 1 on the subsample where covariates
are available, we obtain estimates nearly identical to those in column 2. For Partille (columns
3 and 4), ANCOVA estimates for the monthly treatment are similar to either Varberg inter-
vention, both with and without added covariates. Point estimates for quarterly feedback are
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Varberg Partille
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Static (monthly) -0.218*** -0.263***
(0.026) (0.028)
Dynamic (monthly) -0.241*** -0.290***
(0.028) (0.030)
Monthly (static) -0.236*** -0.227***
(0.035) (0.035)
Quarterly (static) -0.178*** -0.187***
(0.038) (0.037)
Baseline waste average 0.761*** 0.755*** 0.702*** 0.707***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Household size -0.013 0.046***
(0.012) (0.016)
Age of household head -0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Male household head -0.007 0.026
(0.026) (0.037)
Child in household 0.196*** 0.062
(0.048) (0.064)
Recycling-station distance 0.013 -0.243*
(0.020) (0.126)
Two-week collection cycle -0.132
(0.107)
p value, β1 = β2 0.466 0.420 0.126 0.277
Block by period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 250,145 215,943 86,430 83,609
R2 0.375 0.373 0.393 0.390
Table presents our main ANCOVA regression estimates for average treatment effects on per-
person residual waste. Head of household interpreted as oldest member of household. Variable
‘Recycling-station distance’ measured in km. Robust standard errors clustered at the cluster
level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2: The effect of treatment on per-person residual waste: ANCOVA
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somewhat smaller than for monthly feedback, though the difference is not significant. With
the municipality control post-treatment average at about 2.55 kg/person, these estimates
correspond to a decrease of 7-9%.
Given the lack of pretreatment outcome balance in Partille, in Table 3 we run regres-
sions like those in column 1 and 3 of Table 2 using difference-in-differences in place of AN-
COVA.17 Note that predetermined controls are invariant within household and thus cannot
be used with difference-in-differences. Appendix D.1 supports these regressions by test-
ing the parallel-trend assumption through a series of placebo treatment tests, counterfac-
tually assuming that interventions had begun at various points throughout the actual pre-
treatment period. These regressions confirm our earlier conjecture that pre-treatment trends
are roughly parallel in both municipalities. Thus, for Partille, the difference-in-difference
analysis in Table 3 is our preferred specification. In Varberg, results in Table 3 are nearly
identical to the earlier ANCOVA estimates. Point estimates for Partille are slightly larger,
at about 0.25 kg/person.
To put these seemingly large reductions into perspective, it is useful to examine what
fee increase might have produced similar effects if applied throughout the post-experimental
period. In a recent synthetic-control study of Italian unit-based pricing, Bueno and Valente
(2019) conclude that a e0.09 per liter volume-based fee reduces unsorted waste by 37.5%, a
percentage effect size 4-5 times larger than ours. Assuming a conversion factor of 0.2 kg/liter
of residual waste,18 the Bueno and Valente (2019) fee translates into $0.54/kg. Thus, as a
rough estimate of the equivalent fee increase, we simply divide $0.54/kg by four or five,
yielding an increase of about 32-40% of the current Varberg unit-based fee ($0.34), and 54-
60% of the Partille fee ($0.2). The effects we observe thus translate into quite large price
increases which, strikingly, also exceed the equivalent price increase of 11-20% reported for
electricity by Allcott (2011).
All of the above linear-in-parameters regressions do fail to account for two potentially
important features of our data. First, about 15% of all weight observations in both munici-
palities are equal to zero. Although such corner solutions may be due to stringent recycling
17All results in both Table 2 and Table 3 are robust to applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple
hypothesis testing within regression, adjusting the critical values of the two treatment coefficients as well as
that of the β1 = β2 test (i.e., m = 3).
18This conversion factor, also used by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004), is additionally supported in the raw
waste data. We interpret the upper end of the distribution of weights (in kg) collected from a given type
of waste bin as an approximation of its capacity. Since the data also list each bin type’s volume, we can
calculate kg/liter factors by dividing, e.g., the 99th percentile of collected weights by the volume. This











p value, β1 = β2 0.371 0.138
Block by period FE Yes Yes




Within R2 0.000 0.001
Table presents regression difference-in-differences estimates for average
treatment effects on per-person residual waste. Within R2 relates to re-
maining variation after absorbing both address and block-by-period fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the cluster level reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3: The effect of treatment on per-person residual waste: difference-in-differences
efforts, they are perhaps more likely the result of factors not directly related to waste be-
havior, such as trips away from the household. Second, the distribution of weights is highly
right-skewed; indeed, viewed in a histogram, the empirical distribution essentially decreases
monotonically for all positive weights and features a long right tail. This suggests that it may
be more appropriate to model the outcome conditional mean as exponential in the covariates.
In Appendix G, therefore, we perform a robustness test accounting for both of these
features by estimating the lognormal hurdle model of Cragg (1971). Unlike a standard Type I
Tobit model, this approach has the benefit of assuming separate variables and/or coefficients
driving corner solutions compared to weight choices conditional on weights being strictly
positive. It also assumes an exponential rather than linear model for the interior outcomes.
The resulting treatment coefficients (Appendix Table G.1) are comparable but somewhat
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larger than in Tables 2 and 3, exceeding 0.3 kg/person in some cases and implying reductions
of up to 12% compared to the control group. Additionally, treatment-effect differences
between monthly and quarterly feedback in Partille are now significant.
Appendix G also presents several other variants of the analysis in Tables 2 and 3: (i) in
Table G.2, we do not control for block status in any way, instead including only period fixed
effects; (ii) in Table G.3, we collapse the data at the cluster level, using clusters as our unit
of analysis and cross-sectional cluster averages of residual waste as outcome variable; (iii)
in Table G.4, we pool both municipal data sets and run difference-in-differences regressions
that include three treatment variables, where one represents monthly static feedback in both
municipalities; and (iv) in Table G.5, we re-run our preferred regressions using residual waste
per household as outcome variable. All four exercises yield results that confirm those already
reported.
Finally, we check for spillovers between treatment and control. In most situations, such
interference will reduce any treatment-control difference and bias effect estimates toward
zero. For example, members of control households may hear about the feedback letters from
receiving neighbors, possibly motivating them to reduce their own waste. Noting that the
waste bins are not generally locked in either municipality, a priori we also cannot rule out a
spillover effect running in the opposite direction: that norm-based feedback induces receiving
households to dump some of their waste in a (control) neighbor’s bin. This would tend to
inflate treatment-control differences, biasing estimates away from zero.
We take a closer look at illicit disposal in section 6.1.1. For now, we note that certain
items included in our endline questionnaire are helpful for weighing concerns about dumping;
responses are reported in panel A of Table A.1, given in Appendix A.4. Some caution is
advised in interpreting the survey responses, given that response rates are generally low:
only about 5% of treated households, and 10-18% of control households, participated in the
survey. Nevertheless, no more than 10% of control-group respondents claim to be aware of
the project, or to have discussed it with others; the overlap is partial, with only 6.6% (3.1%)
of control respondents claiming to both be aware of the project and to have discussed it in
Varberg (Partille). Among those who have discussed the letters, most did so with someone
other than immediate neighbors. Finally, the Partille survey asked respondents whether they
thought the letters had ‘made any of their neighbors dispose of their waste in an illegal way’:
strikingly, only about 2.5% of respondents thought so.
Taken together, these results suggest that treatment-control interference is not a major
concern. Nevertheless, we are also able to directly check for spillovers between adjacent
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neighbors in our data. For Partille, we construct a binary indicator for 597 households (32%)
that belong to a control cluster while being directly adjacent to at least one treated household.
Including the indicator as an additional treatment variable captures any differential effect
compared to control households that are not adjacent to treatment, typically because they
are in the interior of their cluster. For Varberg, where the large number of households makes
such manual coding impractical, we instead interact both treatment variables with a dummy
for whether a given block is in a rural area, thus flagging 68 blocks (39.5%).19 Although the
test is admittedly crude, the idea is nevertheless that since houses are spaced further apart
in rural areas, spillovers are less likely to occur and thus treatment estimates should exhibit
less bias there. Results are given in Table G.6: neither the additional treatment coefficient
in Partille, nor the interaction coefficient in Varberg is found to be significant.
6 Extensions
6.1. Mechanisms
What strategies do households use to reduce residual waste in response to feedback?
Generally speaking, there are three options available to households. First, as already noted,
they may be turning to illicit disposal, i.e., dumping. Second, they might increase their sort-
ing efforts, thus diverting waste from the residual bin to various recyclable fractions. Third,
they may reduce the amount of waste generated, for example by buying more packaging-free
products. Quantitative analysis is complicated by the fact that, as in the wider economic
literature on waste management, little reliable data is available for any of these three waste-
reduction categories. Nevertheless, we will discuss each mechanism in turn.
6.1.1. Illicit disposal
As already noted, few respondents in our endline survey (Table A.1) believe illicit disposal
is a concern. We are able to complement the survey data by accessing municipal records on
dumping incidents related to household waste. These necessarily represent a partial measure,
since some types of dumping (e.g., in lakes) are unobservable in the short run. Nevertheless,
we would expect any substantial effect on dumping to show up in the records.
In Partille, dumping data are available for 2018 (6 incidents) and the intervention year
of 2019 (7 incidents), suggesting no major treatment effect on illicit disposal. Since illicit
disposal might also occur across the border of small municipalities like Partille, we also
19We visually inspect a map of the municipality to find the blocks corresponding most closely to the set
of urban centres (as defined by Statistics Sweden) with at least 300 inhabitants as of 31 December, 2018.
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check for dumping incidents in neighboring Härryda municipality, where monthly data on
dumping of household waste are available from 2015 through to late 2020. Incident frequency
is increasing prior to 2019, so we add a linear time trend in additon to a dummy that equals
one from March 2019 onward. The dummy is non-significant (p = 0.896), a result which
does not change when instead we ‘switch off’ the dummy after our intervention concluded in
October 2019.
In Varberg, municipal records exist from 2015 onward and are disaggregated by waste
fraction, allowing us to consider dumping of household waste separately from waste types
not targeted by our intervention, such as chemicals, scrap vehicles, and building materials.
We do find a spike in dumping incidents related to household waste in 2019 (8 instances,
compared to 1-4 during 2015-2018). However, a similar increase appears in 2019 for non-
household waste (9 incidents, compared with 2-6 in earlier years), suggesting the variation
is unrelated to our experiment. In any case, as in Partille, all incident numbers are clearly
extremely small in relation to the number of treated households, so effects on dumping (if
any) seem likely to be very minor.
6.1.2. Recycling and prevention
Given that illicit disposal can arguably be ruled out as a mechanism, we now turn to
recycling of waste. Recyclables include food, paper, and packaging waste. Starting with
food waste, recall that household-specific food weights are available in our main data sets.
Figure 4 depicts raw time series for this food-waste variable. Unlike in Figure 3, average
pre-treatment weights appear roughly to coincide for all treatment arms in either figure,
suggesting ANCOVA regressions may be run in both municipalities. Nevertheless, we also
run difference-in-difference regressions in Appendix Table G.7, and supporting placebo re-
gressions in Appendix D.2; the results are very similar to those presented here.
In Figure 4, averages appear to diverge in the post-treatment period, although the effect is
much less pronounced than found in Figure 3 for residual waste; note that increased recycling
translates into more food waste being collected. ANCOVA regression estimates (Table 4)
are consistent with the figure: except for an insignificant and near-zero coefficient for the
quarterly treatment, ATEs on food waste cluster around 0.03 kg/person, about one eighth
of the reduction in residual waste. We conclude that most of that reduction must be due to
other mechanisms.
As for paper and packaging, these waste types are subject to extended producer re-
sponsibility regulation and are not collected curbside from single-family homes in Varberg


















































Figure 4: Food-waste averages by treatment arm and two-week period
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Varberg Partille
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Static (monthly) 0.033*** 0.021
(0.012) (0.013)
Dynamic (monthly) 0.027** 0.026*
(0.013) (0.015)
Monthly (static) 0.037** 0.035**
(0.016) (0.016)
Quarterly (static) 0.008 0.002
(0.016) (0.016)
Baseline waste average 0.790*** 0.788*** 0.772*** 0.769***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
Household size -0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Age of household head -0.001* -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Male household head 0.024* -0.003
(0.013) (0.016)
Child in household 0.016 0.056**
(0.018) (0.025)
Recycling-station distance 0.003 -0.066
(0.009) (0.060)
p value, β1 = β2 0.668 0.741 0.059 0.023
Block by period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 250,250 216,040 87,969 85,137
R2 0.443 0.442 0.499 0.496
For both municipalities, table presents ANCOVA regression estimates for average treatment ef-
fects on per-person food waste, interpreted as a mechanism for residual-waste reduction. Head of
household interpreted as oldest member of household. Variable ‘Recycling-station distance’ mea-
sured in km. Variable ‘Two-week collection cycle’ not included in the Partille regressions as, for
food waste, it equals zero for only about 0.3% of households. Robust standard errors clustered
at the cluster level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4: The effect of treatment on per-person food waste
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the producer-owned corporation responsible for station maintenance does compile figures
for collected paper and packaging by municipality and year, it does so by summing totals
across multiple municipalities and then, ex post, re-allocating back to each locality on a
non-standardized basis. As a result, the impact of any intervention that does not affect
re-allocation procedures will be strongly diluted in this data set, and so we do not use it.
An alternative approach to estimating recycling and prevention is to perform a waste
composition analysis of residual waste in participating households. The idea is that learn-
ing how the post-experimental content of residual waste differs across control and treated
households allows us, at least in principle, to infer recycling and prevention behavior for all
waste fractions. For example, a lower share of packaging thrown in the residual bin suggests
that recycling and/or prevention of packaging waste has increased. We carried out such an
analysis in late November 2019, less than a month after the final feedback letter was sent.
The procedure was the following. First, a contractor collected all residual waste generated
during a single waste cycle from a (sub)sample of 661 participant households in Partille. The
sample was nonrandom but included all single-family households in a particular area within
the municipality, and thus was split roughly equally across treatment arms. Two sets of
separate but nearly concurrent collection runs were made: one for control households, and
one for both treatments. Once all waste had been collected, a random sample of about 500
kilograms (10-20% of collected waste, depending on the group) was made from the waste
totals of each collection run. The composition analysis is on that subsample.
While the procedure just described does not permit us to calculate confidence intervals,20
we present the point estimates, given as weights belonging to each waste type, in Table 5.
First, we calculate the weight proportions of each waste fraction. Next, supposing those
proportions applied to all participating addresses in Partille, we multiply them either by the
control-group post-experimental mean of 2.55 kg/capita (control), or by the same value less
the average of the treatment-effect estimates given in column 3 of Table 3, which is 0.241
(pooled treatment). As a result, post-treatment residual waste is decomposed by waste
fraction in the rows labeled ‘yit’. Finally, we compare the results across control and pooled
treatment. Note that we are unable to distinguish recycling from prevention: reductions in
20The consultancy in charge of sampling did not separately measure waste from different households.
Suppose the subsamples are composed of discrete items (e.g., a metal can or a plastic bottle), with each
item a random draw from the corresponding ‘supersample’ collected by the contractor. Then, given fraction-
specific distributions of item weights, one might at least construct weight-proportion confidence intervals
based on variation within the supersample. The fraction-specific item weight distributions are unknown, but
might be obtained separately and ex post, assuming they remain roughly constant across time and space.







Control (N = 238)
Weight (kg) 165.5 200.2 43.1 99.1 507.9
Weight share (%) 32.6 39.4 8.5 19.5 100.0
yit (kg/person) 0.831 1.005 0.216 0.498 2.550
Pooled treatment (N = 423)
Weight (kg) 147.6 192.2 71.2 110.1 521.1
Weight share (%) 28.3 36.9 13.7 21.1 100.0
yit (kg/capita) 0.654 0.852 0.315 0.488 2.309
Reduction: yit (kg/person) 0.177 0.154 -0.099 0.010 0.241
Table presents results from a composition analysis of waste generated by 661 households in Par-
tille. Rows ‘yit’ estimate weights in kg/person for control and pooled treatment as a whole, mul-
tiplying the weight shares of the composition analysis by either the control-group post-treatment
mean (2.550 kg/capita), or by the same value less the average of the Partille ATE point estimates
in column 3 of Table 3 (0.241). Row ‘Reduction’ gives the resulting fraction-specific differences
across control and pooled treatment.
Table 5: Results of a waste composition analysis
Table 5 may be due to either, or both, mechanisms.
Based on the composition analysis, treated households throw 0.177 kg/person less food
waste in the unsorted bin than do control households. This is a much larger reduction than
the corresponding increase in sorted food waste found in Table 4. Several explanations are
possible. First, as noted, some of the reduction computed in Table 5 may be due to prevention
and will therefore not show up as increases in sorted food waste. Second, the composition
analysis may of course not be representative of Partille as a whole, due to sampling and/or
measurement error. Third, the composition analysis treats unopened packaged food as part
of the food-waste fraction, but the packaging itself would obviously not add to sorted food
waste if such items were correctly source separated. In any case, the reduction in paper and
packaging waste is roughly equal to that in food waste, suggesting households respond to
treatment by reducing both fractions more or less equally. These reductions are somewhat
offset by increases in the ‘other, avoidable’ fraction, including for instance organic (garden)
waste, cloth, utensils, etc.
Our endline survey finally provides an alternative source of guidance for judging the
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relative contribution of recycling and prevention across various fractions. In panel B of Table
A.1, we ask control and treated households whether their waste behavior had changed during
the intervention period; and if so, what the most substantial change was.21 Here, increased
prevention and/or recycling of food waste appears rare. Indeed, nearly half of households
state increased recycling of paper and packaging as their main response to treatment; though
stated prevention behavior is also not negligible in our sample.22
6.2. Heterogeneous treatment effects
A general finding in the existing literature on norm feedback, whether with respect to
water or energy usage, is that treatment effects are largely driven by high users (see e.g.,
Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Jaime Torres and Carlsson, 2018; Andor et al., 2020).
Does such a pattern hold within the waste domain as well? To check this, we interact
both treatment variables with indicators for each household’s position in the distribution of
average pre-experimental (t ≤ 0) waste weights.




i × (λkt + β1T 1j + β2T 2j ) + θȳPREi + εijkt
where qdeci represents a full set of dummy variables for the baseline waste-weight decile to
which address i belongs. Thus, we allow both treatment effects and block-specific time trends
to vary by decile.23 For Partille, recall that our preferred model is instead a difference-in-
differences regression where baseline periods remain included in the data. We then run
yijkt = q
dec
i × (λkt + β1T 1j + β2T 2j ) + αi + εijkt
where αi are address fixed effects, and I is the binary indicator function.
21Simple two-proportions tests confirm that changed waste practices are more common among treated
households (p = 0.037 in Varberg, p < 0.001 in Partille). By contrast, chi-square homogeneity tests fail
to reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of specific changes made is equal across treatment and
control.
22For Partille, we are able to support this final point with additional evidence: in July and August
2020, nine months after the last letter was sent, we had research assistants check for ‘no-ads stickers’ on the
mailboxes of all 2,398 single-family homes (split roughly equally across treatment arms) in three specific areas
of the municipality. Sticker rates were found to be about 6.4 percentage points higher in the monthly group
(two-proportions test: p = 0.011), and 4.1 percentage points higher in the quarterly group (p = 0.101),
compared to control households. We interpret this as evidence of prevention of paper waste, though the
amount of waste thus avoided is unknown. Overall long-run effects are discussed in Section 6.4.
23Highly similar results are obtained if the decile-specific block-by-time fixed effects are replaced by decile-
specific nonparametric time trends along with nonspecific block fixed effects.
27
For each municipality and treatment, Figure 5 plots the resulting decile treatment ef-
fects and associated confidence intervals. Estimates follow the expected pattern, with more
pronounced effects among households with high baseline generation. Indeed, reductions in
the highest deciles are about 0.5 kg/person (15-20%), twice as large as our estimated ATEs.
At the lower end of the baseline distribution, effects instead approach zero, so there is little
evidence of a ‘boomerang’ effect such that low-decile households generate more waste when
treated (Schultz et al., 2007).
6.3. Effects of injunctive norms: regression discontinuity
A few studies on energy-use feedback (Allcott, 2011; Costa and Kahn, 2013) have also
evaluated causal effects specifically of the injunctive norm content included in the letters, i.e.,
of receiving the rating ‘Good’ versus ‘Room for improvement’ (one or no smiley) or ‘Great’
(one or two smileys). Recall that these ratings are assigned based on the cutoff criterion
that a household’s weight lies at or below the relevant reference-group average. As a result,
(sharp) regression discontinuity (RD) analysis may be applied, comparing households with
different ratings in the vicinity of the cutoff.
As a preliminary step, we first compute values of a ‘running variable’ dit to all residual-
waste weights for household i and period t. Here, the running variable is the distance between
own-household waste and the relevant cutoff, as shown in the last feedback letter received
by i prior to (and including) period t. As a result, cutoffs occur at dit = 0. Provided the
conditional mean of potential outcomes is smooth at dit = 0, observations arbitrarily close
to this point on either side will be valid counterfactuals of each other (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). The implication is that discontinuities in average residual-waste weights across the
cutoff may be taken as caused by the switch in ratings.
In Appendix E, we plot residual waste against dit and also estimate discontinuities using
local linear regression within a ‘bandwidth’ around the cutoff. Bandwidths are selected to
minimize the mean squared error of the RD estimator, and we additionally use robust bias-
corrected inference (Calonico et al., 2014, 2017). These procedures are repeated for both
municipalities and separately for the overall and the efficient-neighbor average cutoffs. We
also vary whether a single uniform bandwidth is used on either side of the cutoff, or differing
bandwidths are allowed; qualitative results are identical across these cases.
In summary, we find all RD estimates to be nonsignificant, except one: in Varberg, there
is a positive effect of about 0.2 kg/person from being labeled ‘Excellent’ rather than ‘Good’
(p < 0.01). This effect, which is about the same magnitude as our main ATEs, stands
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous treatment effects by baseline waste generation: point estimates by
decile, with 95% confidence intervals
the label ‘Excellent’ appears to increase subsequent waste generation, a pattern seemingly
consistent with the psychological theory of ‘moral licensing’, where feeling good about oneself
perversely causes future bad behavior (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Mazar and Zhong, 2010; Gneezy
et al., 2014; Dorner, 2019). However, no such effect arises in Partille, so overall, we would
suggest caution in drawing too strong conclusions from the Varberg findings.24
24Also, note that the replicability of some of the earlier moral-licensing results has been called into question
(Blanken et al., 2014; Urban et al., 2019).
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6.4. Long-run effects
In early 2021, we obtained an additional batch of waste data from our partner munici-
palities, allowing us to examine long-run effects in the year after the intervention concluded.
The new data set extends to late November 2020 and starts directly at the endpoint of the
main data explored thus far, effectively adding post-experimental periods 19-44.
Most HER studies have found that treatment effects are remarkably persistent for both
energy (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Alberts et al., 2016) and water use (Ferraro et al., 2011;
Bernedo et al., 2014), often with more than half of the original effect remaining after a
year or more. The pattern of immediate change and slow reversion is consistent with some
combination of changes in habits and capital stock. For example, Brandon et al. (2017)
exploit the fact that in the Opower HER experiments, letters were discontinued upon the
sale of a home and not sent to the incoming household. Thus, any residual treatment effect
occurring after sale seems likely to reflect changes in physical capital, and Brandon et al.
(2017) estimate that this channel accounts for 35-55% of the total effect.
Physical capital plays a different role in the waste domain, however. Waste-related phys-
ical capital investments such as in-home recycling bins or ‘no-ads’ stickers are unlikely to
mechanically persist after home sales, limiting the scope for identifying the two channels
through home sales. More importantly, effort and physical capital are complements rather
than substitutes, as stressed by Vollaard and van Soest (2020). As a result, both short-run
and long-run effects will mostly reflect behavior change, with physical capital improvements
reduced to a multiplicative effect.
With these points in mind, we examine long-run effects from all four treatments in Figure
6. We run a single regression in each municipality. These interact both relevant treatment
variables by all periods except t = 0, allowing us to track effect sizes over time.25 Thus, in
the figure, both sets of estimates within a given municipality (e.g., Static, Dynamic) derive
from the same regression, and are presented in separate subfigures purely for clarity. The
Varberg estimates (panel a), being derived from an ANCOVA specification, use only post-
treatment periods, while the Partille difference-in-difference regression (panel b) provides
full event studies that include all periods. Dashed grey lines mark the start and end of our
original post-treatment period. Both regressions include block-by-period fixed effects but no
other covariates (except for baseline averages in Varberg).
Strikingly, we observe quite limited reversion-to-zero effects over the course of the ad-
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Figure 6: Long run effects from treatment: period-by-period point estimates and 95% con-
fidence intervals
ditional year. In Partille, such backsliding is practically nonexistent; in Varberg about one
quarter (half) of the static (dynamic) norm effect is lost. The patterns are consistent with
norm feedback inducing a change in highly sticky, habitual behavior, and are confirmed in
additional regressions where treatment status is interacted with a set of longer durations of
about six periods each (Appendix Table G.7).
7 Cost, benefits, and effectiveness
In this section, we evaluate the costs and benefits of the feedback interventions. The
analysis is necessarily imprecise, because estimates of costs and benefits related to waste
and recycling are generally highly uncertain. This is both because valuation of the external
benefits is challenging, involving a range of different enviromental impacts, and because
estimated costs of waste management vary widely across and within countries. Our aim is
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to evaluate (i) whether our interventions have increased social welfare and, by extension,
(ii) whether expansion of a norm-feedback policy to other Swedish municipalities (with unit-
based pricing) would be efficient. We therefore use Swedish data wherever possible.
Figure 7 shows the basic structure of the analysis. The horizontal axis measures the
amount of residual waste generated by a (representative) household over the entire course
of the intervention. The initial demand curve D0, assumed linear for simplicity, reflects the
household’s marginal benefit of generating unsorted waste, or equivalently, marginal costs of
reducing it. The presence of unit-based pricing implies pre-existing incentive φ.
Our intervention works by shifting the demand curve downward to D1; the shift is parallel
by assumption. Since marginal incentives remain at φ, the result is the ATE shown in the
figure. This ATE involves several welfare implications. First, internal and external costs
associated with the collection and incineration of residual waste drop. Second, internal costs
and external benefits associated with the collection, treatment and recycling of food and
packaging waste increase. The sum of all these costs and benefits, expressed per kilogram of
reduced residual waste, is shown in Figure 7 as the marginal social cost (MSC) of residual
waste. Again for simplicity, we draw the line as horizontal. We also place it above marginal
incentive φ, implying that recycling rates are initially suboptimally low; whether that is the
case for our actual setting remains to be seen.
Third, as residual waste drops, households bear higher abatement costs, reflecting some
combination of effort and capital investments. (Fee payments are considered transfers and
not considered.) Conceptually, these costs are given by a trapezoid area under the demand
curve for residual waste, with width equal to the ATE. However, it is not clear whether the
right area to use lies below D0 or below D1. In a similar welfare analysis, Allcott and Kessler
(2019) argue that if a feedback intervention works exclusively by providing information or
correcting recipient biases regarding consumption utility, then the area below D1 is the
appropriate measure of household disutility from reduced consumption. If feedback operates
exclusively through other channels (e.g., moral pressure), the area below D0 should be used
instead. Following these arguments, we will bound welfare effects by calculating net benefits
under either assumption.
In summary, when the D0 (D1) cost measure is used, the light (light plus dark) shaded
region in Figure 7 represents net social benefits; except for a fourth category of costs not
shown in the figure. These are costs directly associated with our intervention, namely project
administration costs as well as any household net (dis)utility purely from receiving feedback.
Thus, to finally obtain net social benefits, these costs should be subtracted from the shaded
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Figure 7: The behavioral and welfare effects of norm-based feedback
area(s).
Table 6 presents our estimates of the components of the analysis, organized by munici-
pality and treatment. To express all costs and benefits in monetary terms, we make use of
a range of data sources and assumptions. The first and most complex task is to compute
the MSC. Here, we need first to make an assumption regarding what mechanisms underlie
any reduction in residual waste. Because our results on the subject (section 6.1.2) are rather
inconclusive, we will simply assume that each kilogram of residual waste reduced is matched
by a corresponding 750-gram increase in packaging waste, and a 250-gram increase in food
waste.26
We then obtain estimates of the MSC by combining results from the literature on life
cycle analysis (Ambell et al., 2010; Slorach et al., 2019) with environmental shadow prices
from Ahlroth and Finnveden (2011). Appendix F describes these calculations in detail.
Reflecting a range of estimates from valuation studies, environmental shadow prices may
take either a low or a high value. As a result, the MSC may similarly be high or low. The
two estimates are very different, mostly because high and low environmental benefits from
26Marginal social benefits under high shadow prices (see below) are higher for packaging waste than food
waste, so welfare impacts become more favorable as the share attributed to packaging increases.
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Varberg Partille
Static Dynamic Monthly Quarterly
φ ($/kg) 0.34 0.34 0.20 0.20
MSC, low ($/kg) -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41
MSC, high ($/kg) 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
Costs and benefits, high MSC:
ATE (kg/household, all periods) 26.33 27.57 38.05 27.71
Fee increase yielding ATE ($/kg) 0.095 0.099 0.164 0.120
Net benefits excl. feedback costs, D0 ($/household) -0.31 -0.39 3.55 3.21
Net benefits excl. feedback costs, D1 ($/household) 2.18 2.34 9.80 6.52
Administration costs ($/household) 5.53 5.53 5.53 1.84
Net benefits ($/household)
Low -5.84 -5.92 -1.97 1.36
High -3.35 -3.18 4.27 4.68
Allcott and Kessler (2019) 43% rule 0.51 0.79 5.49 6.18
Costs and benefits, high MSC, extrapolated effect:
Extrapolated ATE (kg/household, all periods) 47.24 33.87 104.82 81.36
Number of post-intervention periods 120 72 120 120
Net benefits ($/household)
Low -5.32 -5.59 4.18 7.20
High -2.38 -3.07 21.56 17.67
Allcott and Kessler (2019) 43% rule 10.83 7.77 30.35 23.55
Table 6: Summary of costs and benefits, by treatment
recycling of packaging differ by a factor of 22. Indeed, the MSC turns out to be negative
for low shadow prices, in which case the socially optimal recycling rate is clearly zero and
any intervention to reduce residual waste will reduce welfare.27 The high value of the MSC,
however, is $0.38/kg, slightly larger than the pre-existing incentive φ in Varberg and almost
twice that of Partille. Existing targets and policies for waste strongly suggest that policy
makers believe the marginal social benefits of recycling are positive, and we will focus on the
high value throughout the remainder of this section.
27See Kinnaman (2006) for one cost-benefit analysis with similar results.
34
Next, to obtain estimates of the ATE shown in Figure 7, we sum the long-run estimates
in Appendix Table G.8 across all 44 data periods. For the Varberg static norm, for instance,
this total effect equals 26.33 kg/household. As a result, the rectangle below the MSC curve
has an area of 0.38 ∗ 26.33 = $9.89 for a representative household in this treatment. To
calculate household waste-reduction costs (the areas below the demand curves), we again
turn to Bueno and Valente (2019) to first calculate the fee increase that, if applied in all
post-intervention periods, would produce a total effect equal to 26.33 kg/household. This
increase is about 9.5 cents/kg.28 For a linear demand curve, the area below D1 in Figure 7
can then be calculated as 26.33× 0.34− (26.33× 0.095)/2 = $7.71 per household; the area
below D0 is similarly calculated as 26.33×0.34+(26.33×0.095)/2 = $10.20. As a result, net
benefits excluding feedback costs equal either 9.89− 7.71 = $2.18 or 9.89− 10.20 = $− 0.31,
depending on the cost measure used.29
Finally, we subtract direct intervention costs as given by the project budget. While
our experiments have involved some fixed costs, these are largely due to the initial software
coding needed for feedback construction, and are expected to be negligible in any application
of our systems to other municipalities. Thus, we subtract only variable operation costs, i.e.,
due to letter paper, envelopes, printing, packaging, and postal fees. This leaves overall (low
or high) net benefits that are either negative or positive, depending on the municipality and
to a lesser degree the household cost measure used.
Much of the variation in net benefits is explained by the fact that marginal social costs are
already largely internalized in Varberg, with φ ≈ MSC. Thus, unlike Partille, even quite
low-cost interventions to reduce residual waste further are difficult to justify in Varberg
based on economic costs and benefits. The more persistent second-year effects observed in
Partille also translate into larger benefit estimates. Notably, the smaller ATE from quarterly
feedback is more than compensated for by lower operation costs, suggesting that less frequent
feedback can be more efficient.
None of these net-benefit estimates include the direct positive or negative utility impacts
households experience purely from receiving feedback. We have no data on such effects,
28For Varberg, the 37.5% reduction found by Bueno and Valente (2019) in response to a $0.54/kg fee
corresponds to 0.375 × 3.4 = 1.275 kg per person and two-week period. Multiplying by (i) the average
number of people per household in Varberg (2.7), and (ii) by the number of post-experimental periods (44),
we find that a $0.54/kg fee may be expected to reduce waste by a total of 151.47 kg/household. The
equivalent fee increase is thus (26.33/151.47)× 0.54 = $0.095/kg. An analogous calculation is performed for
other treatments; recall that the control average is 2.55 kg/person in Partille, with 3.0 people per household.
29Note that in the latter case, the MSC curve actually intersects D0, so the lightly shaded area in Figure
7 transforms into two triangles with opposing welfare effects.
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and an in-depth examination of the role they play for waste feedback is left for future
research. As a speculative exercise, however, we may apply the ‘43% rule’ of Allcott and
Kessler (2019). Specifically, they estimate US households’ willingness to pay for receiving
HER feedback, concluding that total costs to households (including both utility effects from
receiving feedback and costs from reducing use) amount to 43% of savings from reduced use.
Supposing the same figure applies in our setting, then for example, 43% of savings in the
Varberg static treatment is 26.33×0.34×0.43 = $3.85, implying net benefits of 9.89−3.85−
5.53 = $0.51. Table 7 shows that applying the 43% rule generally increases net benefits.
Again however, the exercise is only valid to the extent that the ratio of household costs to
savings can be translated from the Allcott and Kessler (2019) setting to ours; in particular,
the relatively high opt-out rates noted in Section 3 suggest this is a strong assumption.
7.1. Extrapolated total effects
As observed in section 6.4, there are nonzero effects remaining in all treatments at the
end of the data period. A reasonable but again somewhat speculative exercise, therefore,
is to calculate net benefits for some hypothetical “total” ATE obtained by extrapolating
treatment effects until effects have fully dissipated. To perform the extrapolation, we use
the following ANCOVA regression specification for Varberg,
yijkt = I(1 ≤ t ≤ 18)× (β1T 1j + β2T 2j ) + I(t > 18)× (γ1T 1j + γ2T 2j + δ1T 1j τ + δ2T 1j τ)
+ λkt + θȳ
PRE
i + εijkt
where I is the binary indicator function and τ is a linear time trend. To calculate total
effects for treatment l, we sum βl across initial experimental periods 1-18, and γl + δl × t
thereafter, until effects have receded to zero. For the static-norm treatment, this happens in
period 120, more than four and a half years after the start of treatment.
When we run an analogous difference-in-differences specification for Partille, however,
both δ estimates are negative, indicating that effects are without bound, increasing rather
than diminishing over time. It seems prudent not to use these coefficients for extrapolation.
Nevertheless, to at least provide a rough comparison with results for Varberg, we first sum
over the long-run estimates in Appendix Table G.8 and, for periods t > 18, simply keep
adding the last effect estimated in that table up until period 120.
The results are displayed in the bottom portion of Table 7. Clearly, extrapolation does
little to change results in Varberg, but has a large impact on net benefits in Partille, which
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are now about $5-20 per household.30 Applying the 43% rule again increases net benefits
even further. The large welfare improvements in Partille arise because the MSC is high
compared to φ and extrapolated effects do not attenuate over time. In conclusion, net
social benefits from feedback are largely determined by the degree to which the financial and
external marginal costs of waste management are already internalized through the weight-
based fee. When such costs are significantly less than fully internalized, as in Partille,
feedback interventions potentially deliver large increases in welfare.
7.2. Cost-effectiveness analysis
Regardless of welfare concerns, it may also be useful to consider the cost-effectiveness of
norm feedback compared to other policies that municipalities might use to reducing house-
hold waste in line with policy targets. Foremost among these is arguably the replacement
of drop-off facilities for packaging waste with curbside collection, thus reducing household
effort (and to some extent, monetary) costs associated with recycling. Figures from the
Swedish Waste Management Association (2016), a stakeholder organization mainly repre-
senting municipalities and public utilities, allows us to calculate the added administrative
cost of operating such systems.31 The report considers two types of curbside collection: opti-
cal sorting and four-compartment waste bins. For municipalities with similar characteristics
to Varberg and Partille, additional costs of the two system variants are estimated at 130
and 60 SEK per household and year, respectively. Taken over a period of 1.7 years, i.e.,
the approximate length of our long-run data period, these figures translate into $26.37 and
$12.17 per household.
By comparison, our total operation cost of providing monthly norm feedback is about
$5.50 per household, and quarterly feedback costs only $1.84 per household. As a result,
curbside collection would need to produce effects on residual waste several times larger
than those reported in this paper to compete with feedback interventions. Existing policy
evaluations (e.g., Bucciol et al., 2015; Best and Kneip, 2019) suggest effects of about 20%,
so the cost-effectiveness of norm feedback seems at the very least on par with alternative
approaches for reducing household waste.
30Varberg net benefits are nevertheless slightly higher for the extrapolated than the main ATE, despite
being negative at the margin in the latter case (footnote 28). This is because, since fee φ is assumed
to produce a uniform effect across periods, the demand curve in Figure 7 grows increasingly flat as more
periods are considered.
31These costs do not include fixed costs of switching to the new regime, which typically include purchases




This paper has presented results from two large-scale behavioral interventions providing
Swedish households in the municipalities of Varberg and Partille with feedback on how much
residual (unsorted) waste they generate compared to neighbors. Depending on treatment
and methodology, we estimate immediate average treatment effects (waste reductions) of
7-12%. We also conclude, based on the current state of the art in estimating effects from
unit-based pricing of waste, that these reductions correspond to a percentage increase in
existing weight-based waste fees of about 30-60%. The results do not appear to be driven
by illicit waste disposal by households. Finally, effects are highly persistent, with at least
one-third of the immediate reduction remaining one year after treatment was discontinued.
Indeed, for the two Partille treatments, effects show no sign of attenuating at all, seemingly
increasing rather than diminishing over time.
These results provide strong “proof of concept” that norm-based feedback to households
could be a useful non-price tool for reducing waste in line with policy goals. Feedback also
appears highly cost-effective compared to curbside packaging collection, arguably the main
alternative measure for reducing household residual waste. However, we also find that the
net effect of feedback on social welfare strongly depends on the extent to which existing waste
fees internalize the marginal social cost of residual waste. In Varberg, where weight-based
fees are already close to a (high) estimate of that marginal social cost, feedback is found to
have negative net benefits. Moreover, our particular experimental design clearly relies on
the pre-existence of unit-based pricing. Thus, an important question to ask is this: Could
norm feedback be applied in areas where unit-based pricing systems do not exist, and net
benefits are thus likely to be positive and large?
We believe so: a policy maker interested in conducting feedback interventions could,
for instance, arrange to lease collection trucks capable of weighing for the duration of the
intervention. The resulting temporary weight database could then be used to construct
accurate feedback. While such methods are likely to increase intervention costs somewhat,
we expect these extra costs to be more than compensated for by the added benefit of reducing
waste where no pre-existing marginal incentive exists. It also seems plausible that treatment
effects would be larger, since areas without pre-existing incentives are likely to contain more
“low-hanging fruits”than already regulated areas like Varberg or Partille.32 A full exploration
32A potential complication related to these points is offered by the recent experiment of Myers and Souza
(2020), where norm feedback failed to reduce heating demand among households that do not pay for energy
use. The authors suggest that feedback may require pre-existing incentives to be effective. Their setting
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of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
More generally, a limitation of the municipal data used in this paper is that individual
households are identifiable only in single-family housing. This problem, which it may be
noted does not appear within the electricity domain, needs to be addressed before accurate,
household-level feedback can be provided in apartment blocks. On a purely technical level,
it may not be insurmountable. For example, utilities could issue household-specific waste
bags, similar to bag-based pricing systems, and base feedback on the number of bags thrown
per household. However, municipalities may be reluctant to pay the fixed cost of introducing
such systems purely to facilitate feedback nudges.
An alternative which remains little explored in the literature on norm feedback is to pro-
vide feedback at a more aggregated level. In apartment blocks, it may be feasible to present
feedback by building rather than household. We do expect such aggregated feedback to in-
troduce additional problems of coordination and cooperation between households, possibly
diluting its effect. On the other hand, existing feedback interventions already presuppose
some degree of cooperation between household members (a point also made by Brülisauer
et al., 2020), though there is greater scope for communication and observability within than
between households. Nevertheless, exploring whether aggregate norm feedback could usefully
complement the standard HER design seems a promising avenue for future research.
was distinctive in some respects: a highly environmentally conscious student sample was used, possibly
limiting the scope for improvement; and feedback specifically targeted heating rather than overall energy
use. Nevertheless, future research should investigate whether their findings apply to other domains.
39
References
A. Abadie, S. Athey, G.W. Imbens, and J. Wooldridge. When should you adjust standard
errors for clustering?, 2017. NBER Working Paper No. 24003.
S. Ahlroth and G. Finnveden. Ecovalue08 — A new valuation set for environmental systems
analysis tools. Journal of Cleaner Production, 19(17-18):1994–2003, 2011.
G. Alberts, Z. Gurguc, P. Koutroumpis, and R. Martin. Competition and norms: A self-
defeating combination? Energy Policy, 96:504–523, 2016.
H. Allcott. Social norms and energy conservation. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 2011.
H. Allcott. Site selection bias in program evaluation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130
(3), 2015.
H. Allcott and J.B. Kessler. The welfare effect of nudges: A case study of energy use social
comparisons. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(1), 2019.
H. Allcott and T. Rogers. The short-run and long-run effects of behavioral interventions:
experimental evidence from energy conservation. American Economic Review, 104(10),
2014.
M.A. Allers and C. Hoeben. Effects of unit-based garbage pricing: A differences-in-differences
approach. Environmental and Resource Economics, 45(3):405–428, 2010.
C. Ambell, A. Björklund, and M. Ljunggren Söderman. Potential för ökad material̊atervin-
ning av hush̊allsavfall och industriavfall, 2010. Report, TRITA-INFRA-FMS 2010:4.
M.A. Andor, A Gerster, J. Peters, and C.M. Schmidt. Social norms and energy conservation
beyond the US. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 103, 2020.
I. Ayres, S. Raseman, and A. Shih. Evidence from two large field experiments that peer
comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage. The Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, 29(5), 2012.
C. Berglund. The assessment of households’ recycling costs: The role of personal motives.
Ecological Economics, 56:560–569, 2006.
M. Bernedo, P.J. Ferraro, and M. Price. The persistent impacts of norm-based messaging
and their implications for water conservation. Journal of Consumer Policy, 37(3):437–452,
2014.
40
H. Best and T. Kneip. Assessing the causal effect of curbside collection on recycling behavior
in a non-randomized experiment with self-reported outcomes. Environmental and Resource
Economics, 72(1203-1223), 2019.
I. Blanken, N. van de Ven, M. Zeelenberg, and M.H.C. Meijers. Three attempts to replicate
the moral licensing effect. Social Psychology, 45(3):232–238, 2014.
H.S. Bloom. Randomizing groups to evaluate place-based programs. In H.S. Bloom, edi-
tor, Learning More From Social Experiments: Evolving Analytic Approaches. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 2005.
A. Brandon, P.J. Ferraro, J.A. List, R.D. Metcalfe, M.K. Price, and F. Rundhammer. Do the
effects of social nudges persist? Theory and evidence from 38 natural field experiments,
2017. NBER Working Paper No. 23277.
M. Brülisauer, L. Goette, Z. Jiang, J. Schmitz, and R. Schubert. Appliance-specific feedback
and social comparisons: Evidence from a field experiment on energy conservation. 2020.
A. Bucciol, N. Montinari, and M. Piovesan. Do not trash the incentive! Monetary incentives
and waste sorting. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 117(4):1204–1229, 2015.
M. Bueno and M. Valente. The effects of pricing waste generation: A synthetic control
approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 96:274–285, 2019.
F. Burlig, L. Preonas, and M. Woerman. Panel data and experimental design. Journal of
Development Economics, 144:102458, 2020.
D.P. Byrne, A. La Nauze, and L.A. Martin. Tell me something I don’t already know:
Informedness and the impact of information programs. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 100(3):510–527, 2018.
S. Calonico, M.D. Cattaneo, and R. Titiunik. Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for
regression-discontinuity designs. Econometrica, 82(6):2295–2326, 2014.
S. Calonico, M.D. Cattaneo, and R. Titiunik. Optimal data-driven regression discontinuity
plots. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 110(512):1753–1769, 2015.
S. Calonico, M.D. Cattaneo, M.H. Farrell, and R. Titiunik. rdrobust: Software for regression-
discontinuity designs. The Stata Journal, 17(2):372–404, 2017.
41
S. Carattini, A. Baranzini, and R. Lalive. Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a
Supreme Court decision. Ecological Economics, 148:131–151, 2018.
D.L. Costa and M.E. Kahn. Energy conservation“nudges”and environmentalist ideology: ev-
idence from a randomized residential electricity field experiment. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 11(3), 2013.
J.G. Cragg. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the
demand for durable goods. Econometrica, 39(5):829–844, 1971.
M. Czajkowski, N. Hanley, and K. Nyborg. Social norms, morals and self-interest as deter-
minants of pro-environmental behaviors: The case of household recycling. Environmental
and Resource Economics, 66(4):647–670, 2017.
E. Dijkgraaf and R. Gradus. Environmental activism and dynamics of unit-based pricing
systems. Resource and Energy Economics, 31(1):13–23, 2009.
E. Dijkgraaf and R. Gradus. An EU recycling target: What does the Dutch evidence tell
us? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(3):501–526, 2017.
E. Dijkgraaf and R.H.J.M. Gradus. Cost savings in unit-based pricing of household waste:
The case of The Netherlands. Resource and Energy Economics, 26(4):353–371, 2004.
P. Dolan and R. Metcalfe. Neighbors, knowledge, and nuggets: Two natural field experiments
on the role of incentives on energy conservation, 2015. Becker Friedman Institute for
Research in Economics Working Paper No., 2589269.
Z. Dorner. A behavioral rebound effect. 2019.
C. Ek. Serial-correlation-robust power calculation for the analysis-of-covariance estimator,
2020. Working paper.
C. Ek. A formula for power calculation in cluster-randomized experiments with panel data,
2021. Working paper.
T. Erhardt. Garbage in and garbage out? On waste havens in Switzerland. Environmental
and Resource Economics, 73(1):251–282, 2019.
I. Ferrara and P. Missios. A cross-country study of household waste prevention and recycling:
Assessing the effectiveness of policy instruments. Land Economics, 88(4):710–744, 2012.
42
P.J. Ferraro and M.K. Price. Using nonpecuniary strategies to influence behavior: evidence
from a large-scale field experiment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(1), 2013.
P.J. Ferraro, J.J. Miranda, and M.K. Price. The persistence of treatment effects with norm-
based policy instruments: Evidence from a randomized environmental policy experiment.
American Economic Review, 101(3):318–322, 2011.
G. Finnveden, T. Ekvall, Y. Arushanyan, M. Bisaillon, G. Henriksson, U. Gunnars-
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program 2018-2023: Att göra mer med mindre, 2020. Report. In Swedish.
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Online Appendices for article “Norm-based feedback
on household waste: A large-scale field experiment in
two Swedish municipalities”
Appendix A. Experimental materials
A.1 Frequently asked questions
We here present the set of FAQ available to residents of Varberg. Differences between
the municipalities were minor, both in terms of what questions were included and in terms of
the exact wording of the answers. For example, in Partille we use the term ‘residual waste’
rather than combustible waste, as below. Note that VIVAB is the name of the municipal
utility in charge of waste management in Varberg.
VIVAB is currently distributing information on average waste weights to you and other
single-family households in your area. By making households aware of how much waste they
throw, in kilograms, compared to their negihbors, we are seeking to motivate more people
to reduce their total amount of combustible waste.
Varberg municipality uses a weight-based waste fee. This means that, the less waste thrown
away by a household, the lower are household costs — and the higher are the environmental
gains for a sustainable future in Varberg.
Q. What is the purpose of the project?
A. The purpose is the reduce household combustible waste. Typically, the more waste a
household recycles, the less combustible waste will be thrown away. Similar projects on
electricity and water in other countries have been shown to reduce environmental impacts.
Q. How will I be affected by the project?
A. If your household is included in the project, you will regularly receive a letter with infor-
mation on your household’s combustible waste weight. In the letter, you will be compared
with the average of about 100 households in your neighborhood, as well as with the aver-
age among the 20% of those 100 households that have generated the least combustible waste.
1
Q. I do not want to participate in the project. What happens once I opt out?
A. You can opt out here [link]. Members of households that choose to leave the project
will be immediately excluded from the data set used to compile waste information. However,
households that opt out less than a week before a planned letter-distribution date will receive
one additional letter.
Q. How long will the project be active?
A. The project will be active until further notice.
Q. Why is the project taking place only in Varberg municipality [i.e., not in Falkenberg,
the other municipality serviced by VIVAB]?
A. Varberg municipality has had a weight-based fee since 1994. By comparison, Falkenberg
introduced a weight-based fee in 2014.
Q. Is the project financed by municipal taxes or by waste fees?
A. No. The project is funded by the Swedish government. It is not funded by municipal tax
funds or by waste fees. We are continually working to improve our information and work
processes so that costs are kept as low as possible.
Q. What is the source of the weight information?
A. The garbage trucks of our contractor weigh each waste bin during the collection of house-
hold waste. In the project, each summary presented to households is based on those measured
weights.
Q. The information concerns household combustible waste. What is that?
A. Combustible waste is what remains after other types of waste, like food waste and pack-
aging, have been separated for use in the production of biogas and biofertilizer as well as for
materials recovery.
Q. Will there be any particular consequences as a result of the waste weights presented
for my household?
A. No. The project aims only to provide information on your household’s combustible waste
and allow you to compare your weights with those of households in your neighborhood.
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Q. Why do only single-family homes, and not apartment buildings, receive letters?
A. Apartment buildings have common garbage rooms where all households deposit their
waste. Since we are unable to separate out the combustible waste generated by each house-
hold in apartment buildings, such properties are not included in the project.
Q. Why does my letter have a different design from that of my neighbor?
A. Within the project, we are also exploring various ways of presenting the comparison be-
tween households.
Q. My household has not received a letter. Why not?
A. The project has a limited scope and involves only some parts of the municipality. If you
have not received a letter, the project does not include your area.
Q. My household shares a waste bin with other households. How have our weights been
calculated?
A. We calculate one weight per bin, rather than one weight per household. If a bin is shared
by multiple households, however, the weights will be shared by all members of those house-
holds. Since, as a result, the same information applies to both households, those you share
a bin with have received exactly the same letters as you.
Q. I believe my weights are incorrect. What do I do?
A. The weight information is taken from VIVAB’s database of collected weights. These
weights are already used as the basis for fee payments. If you suspect that the weights
stated in your letter are incorrect, please contact our Customer Service... [contact details]
Q. According to my letter, no weight has been registered. What does that mean?
A. Very rarely, the weight is not registered correctly, for example because an additional bag
of waste has been placed next to the bin. In these situations, we are unable to compare your
weights with other households.
Q. Is weight information available for food waste as well?
A. At present, the project aims specifically at reducing combustible waste, and only that
fraction is included in the letters.
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Q. Do you look at the contents of the waste as well?
A. No. Only the weight is being checked, not the contents.
Q. How do you process my personal data?
A. The project uses household-specific information on waste weights. In addition, register
data (social security number, name, address) will be processed. These data are handled by
a third-party processor, and are used only within this specific project.
Lawful grounds for collection is task in public interest. The project is being operated
with the aim of reducing overall waste for environmental benefit and, by extension, a more
sustainable society.
Q. My household is not comparable with my neighbors. Why am I still being compared? A.
Waste weights are divided by the number of members of each household. We are unable to
account for other factors, such as how often household members are present, and this will
affect comparability to some degree. Still, we believe households are sufficiently comparable
for the information to be relevant.
Q. For the past few weeks, I have not put out my bin for collection. Why am I still be-
ing compared?
A. The letters show how many times your bin has been collected within the relevant period,
so that the comparison can be put into perspective. Most bins are collected once every two
weeks.
Q. Will the information really lead to lower waste? After all, the letters themselves drive an
increase in waste.
A. Research on this type of information provision shows that environmental impacts drop
significantly. Certainly, the letters themselves involve some additional waste, but we have
good reason to believe that the net effect on the environment will be positive.
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A.2 Letter back page
Figure A.1: Example of the back page of a feedback letter (Varberg)
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A.3 Endline survey
Here we present the full questionnaire sent to treated households in Varberg; there was
only very minor variation in survey design between the two municipalities. The survey was
implemented online through the Qualtrics software. Invitation links and QR codes were sent
out as part of the final feedback letter (treated households) or as a separate letter (control
households, Partille quarterly group). Control households faced a similar but shorter survey
to the one below, containing only questions 1, 3, 4 (excl. 4.3), and 5.
What do you think?
Over the last few months, you have received letters from VIVAB containing information
on your amounts of combustible waste. We have tried to examine whether people are moti-
vated to reduce their waste when they become aware of its weight in comparison with that
of their neighbors.
We want to know what you think! In this questionnaire, we would like you to answer a
few questions about the letters and the project.
The survey takes 2-3 minutes to complete.
1. Have you been aware of the project during the last few months? Yes/No
2. Do you think that the letters have helped you to reduce your combustible waste? To
a large extent/To some extent/Not at all
3. Have you made any changes in how you manage waste since March 2019? Yes/No
3.1. If yes, what is the most substantial change that you have made? [Single answer
required]
I have... Put more containers in my home for sorting waste/Improved at sorting
packaging and paper/Improved at sorting food waste/Started to plan my purchases
so as to generate less food waste/Started to plan my purchases so as to generate
less packaging waste/Other: (free text)
4. Have you discussed the letter with people in other households? Yes/No
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4.1. If yes: who have you mainly discussed them with? [Single answer required] Neigh-
bors living adjacent to my property/Neighbors not living next to my property but on
the same street/Other neighbors in the vicinity (within a 100-meter radius)/Other
people
4.2. If yes: did you discuss different ways of reducing your waste? Yes/No
4.3. If yes: did you disclose your weights to each other? Yes/No
5. Would you like to receive more information with waste comparisons in the future?
Yes/No
5.1. If yes: how often would you like to receive the waste comparisons? Once a mon-
th/Once every three months/Once every six months/Once a year
5.2. If yes: how would you like to receive the waste comparisons? Through a waste
services mobile app/As paper mailings/On the invoice for waste services/Through
‘My pages’ on vivab.info
6. In general, what did you think of the letters? Liked them a lot/Liked them some-
what/Neither liked nor disliked them/Disliked them somewhat/Disliked them a lot
7. Was there some information in particular that you believe the letters lacked? [Answer
not required] Free text
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A.4 Endline survey results
Varberg Partille
Control Treatment Control Treatment
N = 541 N = 183 N = 322 N = 253
A. Items on spillover effects
1. Aware of project?
Yes 80 (14.8%) 159 (86.9%) 25 (7.8%) 201 (79.4%)
No 461 (85.2%) 24 (13.1%) 297 (92.2%) 52 (20.6%)
4. Discussed with others?
Yes 55 (10.2%) 128 (70.3%) 22 (6.9%) 128 (50.6%)
No 486 (89.8%) 54 (29.7%) 297 (93.1%) 125 (49.4%)
4.1. If yes: who with?
Neighbor, adjacent 5 (9.3%) 13 (10.2%) 2 (9.1%) 16 (12.9%)
Neighbor, same street 1 (1.9%) 14 (11.0%) 2 (9.1%) 15 (12.1%)
Neighbor, same area 2 (3.7%) 14 (11.0%) 5 (22.7%) 5 (4.0%)
Other 46 (85.2%) 86 (67.7%) 13 (59.1%) 88 (71.0%)
4.2. If yes: discussed how to reduce?
Yes 26 (48.1%) 24 (18.9%) 13 (59.1%) 57 (46.0%)
No 28 (51.9%) 103 (81.1%) 9 (40.9%) 67 (54.0%)
4.3. If yes: disclosed weights?
Yes N/A 29 (22.8%) N/A 53 (42.7%)
No N/A 98 (77.2%) N/A 71 (57.3%)
Suspect dumping?
Yes N/A N/A 8 (2.5%) 6 (2.4%)
No N/A N/A 310 (97.5%) 243 (97.6%)
B. Items on mechanisms
2. Letters had an effect?
Not at all N/A 152 (83.1%) N/A 147 (58.1%)
To some extent N/A 25 (13.7%) N/A 79 (31.2%)
To a large extent N/A 6 (3.3%) N/A 27 (10.7%)
3. Changed waste behavior?
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Yes 50 (9.2%) 27 (14.8%) 25 (7.8%) 60 (23.7%)
No 491 (90.8%) 156 (85.2%) 297 (92.2%) 193 (76.3%)
3.1. If yes: main change made?
More recycling bins in home 8 (16.0%) 6 (22.2%) 1 (4.0%) 4 (6.7%)
More paper/pack. recycled 17 (34.0%) 13 (48.1%) 10 (40.0%) 23 (38.3%)
More food recycled 9 (18.0%) 3 (11.1%) 5 (20.0%) 8 (13.3%)
More paper/pack. prevented 4 (8.0%) 2 (7.4%) 0 3 (5.0%)
More food prevented 2 (4.0%) 1 (3.7%) 2 (8.0%) 12 (20.0%)
Other 10 (20.0%) 2 (7.4%) 7 (28.0%) 10 (16.7%)
Table reports endline survey responses for items related to potential treatment-control interference.
Figure N at the top of the table gives total (partial as well as complete) survey responses in each group.
‘N/A’ means that this particular item was not included in the relevant survey version.
Table A.1: Endline survey results
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Appendix B. Additional information on design and procedures
B.1 Randomization methodology
The experimental data have a multilevel structure, with clusters nested within blocks.
Prior to the start of the study (during 2018), we received lists of all single-family households
served by the municipal waste department in Partille and Varberg, respectively. In Varberg,
the list was not a separate document, but was contained in a GIS database covering all
relevant households. In either case, starting from the list of households, we first exclude a
small number of households (<10%) on the basis of maps and satellite images. In Partille,
the excluded group consists mostly of rural households, while in Varberg, it consists mainly
of households that are clearly of a different type from their immediate neighbors (e.g., single
farms surrounded by residential areas). In both municipalities, we also exclude addresses
that are clearly not households (small businesses, etc.).
The remaining households are manually sorted into contiguous blocks of roughly 100
households each. Next, each block is divided as equally as possible into three contiguous
clusters of about 30 households each (numbered cluster 1, 2, and 3, typically from northwest
to southeast). The clusters are the unit of randomization; treatment status is perfectly
correlated within cluster. The blocks thus represent a form of stratification by neighborhood,
with all three treatment arms represented within each block. As there are three numbered
clusters per block, this creates six possible permutations of treatment arms across the clusters
within each block. We use the Stata random number generator to determine which of these
six combinations apply within each block.
When constructing the blocks, we take care to ensure that (i) each block consists of
similar housing types, and (ii) contains roughly an equal number of households. The point
of both rules is to increase precision. Rule (i) does so because treatment effects are estimated
across clusters, but within block; thus, between-block (but not within-block) variation will
not affect estimator precision. Clearly, it follows that within-block household heterogeneity
should be as small as possible. Rule (ii) improves precision because estimator variance is
increasing in cluster-size variability, which itself increases more or less mechanically with
block variability. The two rules sometimes conflict; since each such situation is unique, we
then use discretion to attain reasonable trade-offs.
When dividing blocks into clusters, we again attempt to make splits as equal as possible,
similarly to rule (ii) above. In addition, we strive to place cluster borders so as to minimize
the number of direct across-border connections between households. This is done to minimize
any bias from contamination between treatment and control, which we hypothesize operates
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between direct neighbors. As a result, households on the same street tend to be assigned to
the same cluster, and cluster borders tend to run through back yards and green areas.
An example of the end result of the above methodology is given in Figure B.1. Solid
lines are block borders, while dashed lines delineate clusters. Note the ID number in the
bottom right of each block. In Varberg, there are 172 blocks, 516 clusters, and a total of
15,723 households. Cluster sizes range between 17 and 45 households per cluster, with an
average of 30.47 (SD = 4.63 households). In Partille, we have 55 blocks, 165 clusters, and
5,756 households. Cluster sizes range between 23-43 households per cluster and average 34.88
households per cluster (SD = 3.55 households). Note that our final sample is smaller due for
instance to various exclusion criteria applied during the intervention; these are described in
Appendix B.2.
Figure B.1: Example of blocks and clusters in northwest Sävedalen, Partille
B.2 Study implementation
Recall that households in a “monthly” condition receive a total of nine feedback letters,
while households in the ‘quarterly’ condition receive three letters. The four-week (‘monthly’)
comparison periods coincide in Partille and Varberg, and always run from a Wednesday to a
Tuesday. The twelve-week (‘quarterly’) comparison period in Partille always corresponds to
exactly three four-week periods, thus also running from Wednesday to Tuesday. For example,
the first set of both monthly and quarterly letters is compiled on 13 March 2019; thus covering
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either the four-week period from 13 February to 12 March, or the twelve-week period from
19 December 2018 to 12 March 2019. Subsequent periods have a similar structure.
The timeline for each batch of feedback letters runs as follows. On the Wednesday imme-
diately following the end of the relevant comparison period, monthly (and, when applicable,
quarterly) letters are compiled using scrubbed data from March 2018 (experimental period
-25, one year before the start of the intervention) up to the current date. The data set is
based on a combination of municipal waste data and register data from the Swedish tax au-
thority. It contains (i) household addresses, (ii) a unique household identifier, (iii) household
treatment arm status, (iv) number of waste collection events (successful or otherwise) in
each comparison period, (v) feedback information (e.g., own and neighbor per-person waste
weights) by comparison period. Whenever an address has no household members in the
tax authority data set, we divide total weights by the municipality average, which is 3.0
people/household in Partille and 2.7 in Varberg.
Although feedback information on the behavior of other households is always presented
in the letters, we include no own-household feedback (e.g., own weights) in any letter where
either of two conditions apply. First, if no successful collection event has occurred during the
latest comparison period, for example due to households never leaving their waste bin out
for collection. Second, if at least one collection event is considered unreliable, for example
due to problems with weighing the bin during collection. We are able to identify such events
because the municipal data includes anomaly reports associated with some collection events,
such as when a bin is not placed curbside and thus cannot be collected. Table B.1 lists how
various anomaly codes are handled in Varberg. In Partille, the list of possible anomalies is
less standardized, making a clean summary infeasible. However, our overall coding is highly
similar, with some collection events flagged as unsuccessful, some as yielding unreliable
weights, and some as being relatively unproblematic such that we disregard the anomaly
report.
Furthermore, some households are dropped from the comparison sample during compi-
lation due to noncomparability issues. For example, the data may strongly suggest that a
property is currently unoccupied. The exclusion criteria are:
 Varberg. For residual waste, strictly fewer than three two-week periods since March
2018 have one or more successful collection events as well as no unreliable collection
event
 Partille. For both residual and food waste, no more than 20% of all periods since
March 2018 have one or more nonzero-weight successful collection events as well as no
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Description Report data code Action taken
Bin not curbside 010 Code as zero
Blocked, car 020 Code as zero
Blocked, snow 030 Code as zero
Blocked, other 040 Code as zero
Locked door/gate 050 Code as zero
Not shoveled 060 Code as zero
Not snowplowed 070 Code as zero
Not gritted 080 Code as zero
Incorrect bin contents, not collected 090 Code as zero
Incorrect bin contents, collected 095 Ignore incident
Overfull 100 Ignore incident
Heavy bin 105 Ignore incident
Other 110 Ignore incident
Broken bin 120 Ignore incident
Bar code missing 130 Code as missing
Label missing 135 Ignore incident
Empty bin 140 Code as zero
Sacks collected 150 Code as missing
Broken wheel 160 Ignore incident
Food waste bag 165 Ignore incident
Food waste bags often 166 Ignore incident
Broken lid 170 Ignore incident
Cannot find bin 180 Code as zero
Bar code broken 190 Code as missing
Manual collection 195 Code as missing
Table lists possible anomaly incidents, their coding in the raw data, and how each
incident is treated during letter compilation.
Table B.1: Anomaly report coding, Varberg
unreliable collection event; or, there are collection events of any form in three or fewer
periods since March 2018.
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Note that these criteria do not exclude outlier weights. Because of the lack of a 20% criterion,
fewer households are typically excluded in Varberg than in Partille (recall that the duration
since March 2018 is at least one year, that is, at least 26 two-weeks periods). The added
criterion for food waste in Partille is used because some households consistently produce
zero weights for residual waste but strictly positive weights for food waste, and it would then
seem that the zero residual weights are ‘legitimate’, arising from diligent sorting efforts.
The data file is sent to a third-party research assistant who matches addresses with
recipient names and removes recipients who have opted out. The list of opt-out households
is updated immediately prior to this step. The assistant then uses the scrubbed waste data
to construct a full set of feedback letters. These are printed and mailed out to households
on the Monday of the following week, implying households receive them on the Tuesday or
Wednesday of that week.
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Appendix C. Power calculation
In this section, we perform analytical power calculations for ANCOVA based on a ‘serial-
correlation-robust’ procedure that accounts for arbitrary autocorrelation in idiosyncratic
errors. The exact procedure is detailed in Ek (2020).33 It starts from an assumed data
generating process (DGP)
yit = λt + βTit + vi + ωit (C.1)
where i and t index unit and time, respectively. The panel is assumed to be balanced.
Randomization occurs at the unit level, with a single treatment captured by Tit = 1 as well
as a comparison group for which Tit = 0. Recall that we randomize by cluster, not unit; we
address this discrepancy below. Error terms vi and ωit are both normally distributed with
mean zero, and V ar(vi) = σ
2
v while V ar(ωit) = σ
2
ω. In addition, ωit is assumed to exhibit
arbitrary serial correlation over time.
We now seek to estimate uniform treatment effect β. The experimental data include m
pre-treatment periods and r post-treatment periods. Furthermore, there are J experimen-
tal units, proportion P of which are treated. Estimation involves running the ANCOVA
regression
yit = αt + τTi + θȳ
PRE
i + εit
on post-treatment observations (so treatment subscript t may be dropped), with robust
standard errors clustered by unit. Regression coefficient τ̂ is the treatment estimate.
Given a non-experimental data set, at least m+ r periods long and following DGP (C.1)
with β = 0, the power of the above ANCOVA regression estimator may be calculated ex ante
using the following procedure. First, in each possible continuous panel of length m + r in
the non-experimental data, yit is regressed on time and unit fixed effects. From the residuals
of this regression, four (co)variance parameters are calculated, stored, and subsequently
averaged across all panels. As first shown in Burlig et al. (2020), the experimental ANCOVA
estimator variance may be closely approximated as a linear combination of the estimands of
the four (averaged) residual-based parameters. In practice, estimates are plugged in in place
33Our pre-analysis plan calculated statistical power based on an i.i.d. data generating process, thus
ignoring serial correlation. However, Burlig et al. (2020) show that i.i.d. formulas tend to overstate power
for long experimental panels such as ours. In line with this point, the results presented here are more
conservative than our initial, pre-registered power estimates.
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of estimands, yielding an approximate minimum detectable effect
MDEest ≈ (tJ1−κ − tJα/2)×
{
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(r − 1)(m+ θr + (1− θ)mr)ψAω̂
)}1/2
(C.2)
where the quantity in curly braces is the rewritten ANCOVA variance. tJ1−κ and t
J
α/2 are
suitable critical values of the t distribution with J degrees of freedom; I is the number of
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ω̂ are
(estimands of) residual-based parameters. Finally, in the above equation, ANCOVA weight
θ is itself computed as a function of the residual-based parameters, such that
θ =
m(4mrσ2v̂ − (m(m− r + 2) + r(r −m+ 2))σ2ω̂)
2r(2m2σ2v̂ + (m(m+ 1)− r(m− 1))σ2ω̂ +m(m− 1)(m+ 1)ψBω̂ − r(m− 1)(r − 1)ψAω̂ )
+
m(−m(m− 1)(m− r + 2)ψBω̂ − r(r − 1)(r −m+ 2)ψAω̂ )
2r(2m2σ2v̂ + (m(m+ 1)− r(m− 1))σ2ω̂ +m(m− 1)(m+ 1)ψBω̂ − r(m− 1)(r − 1)ψAω̂ )
(C.3)
We apply these methods to historical data on per-person residual waste, running throughout
2017 and 2018 in Varberg and Partille, respectively. The non-experimental data are organized
in the same way and subject to the same exclusion criteria as our actual experimental data
set. Thus, they include similar numbers of units (addresses) and span 52 two-week periods.
For our calculations, we consistently use m = 26, r = 18, P = 0.5, and significance level
α = 0.05, as in our main analysis. We also assume statistical power κ = 0.8.
A few adjustments to the procedure are necessary. As noted, we use clusters of some
30 households as our unit of randomization. Cluster randomization reduces power (Bloom,
2005), so assuming unit randomization will generally imply incorrect results. However, sim-
ulations in Ek (2021) suggest ANCOVA estimator precision under cluster randomization is
typically quite close to that which applies when the data are first collapsed at the cluster
level, and clusters are then interpreted as individual units. In particular, the approximation
appears valid when cluster sizes are reasonably balanced, and the ratio of cross-sectional
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and time-varying variation is not too dissimilar at the cluster and unit levels. For the Var-
berg data, the coefficient of variation in cluster sizes is rather small, at 0.172. Also, the
Stata mixed command provides a rough estimate of (i.i.d.) variance components, yielding a
cluster-level ratio of cross-sectional to time-varying variation that is 0.633 times that of the
corresponding ratio at the unit level.
Given these findings, power calculations on cluster-collapsed data should yield approx-
imately valid results. Thus, we proceed to compute yit as the cross-sectional average per-
person waste weight among households in cluster i and period t. In Varberg, I = 516 (all
clusters in the data) while J = 344 (clusters involved in any pairwise treatment-control com-
parison). We then find that MDEest = 0.082 kg/person, about 2.2% of average per-person
residual waste in the (non-collapsed) Varberg data.
However, we are unable to repeat the procedure for Partille because the ANCOVA vari-
ance constructed from the parameters here turns out to be negative. Notice that for m = 26
and r = 18, the second and third factors within the bracket in (C.2) may be negative. As
a result, it is possible in principle for the reconstructed ANCOVA variance as a whole to
sometimes also be negative, given estimation error in the residual-based parameters (Ek,
2020). Obviously, we can also not rule out that model (C.1) is invalid in some respect.
As a second-best approach, we are able to bound the Partille MDE from both sides by
observing, first, that ANCOVA is weakly more efficient than difference-in-differences (upper
bound). Second, cluster randomization lowers power compared to unit randomization (lower
bound). For the upper bound, we run the Burlig et al. (2020) serial-correlation-robust
procedure for difference-in-differences (pc_dd_analytic) on the cluster-collapsed data (I =
165, J = 110), yielding MDEest = 0.164. For the lower bound, we perform the ANCOVA
power calculation (C.2) without first collapsing the data at the cluster level (I = 5, 571,
J = 3, 714). The reconstructed variance is positive in this case and implies MDE est = 0.100.
The resulting MDE range is 3.0-5.0% of average per-person residual waste in Partille. Finally,
since m, r, and P do not differ across municipalities, another approach is to combine the
residual-based parameter estimates obtained for Varberg with Partille values of I and J : this
yields MDEest = 0.147, well within the range.
Two features of our data remain unaccounted for. Their effects on power run in opposite
directions. First, our design blocks clusters by neighborhood, thus improving precision;
second, some 5% of observations are missing, lowering power. We expect the former effect
to dominate. As a first approximation of how missing observations affect power, we repeat
the Varberg power calculation assuming two fewer time periods (m and r both subtracted
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by one). This again produces MDEest = 0.082 kg/person, very nearly the same value as
before. Thus, our MDE estimates seem likely to be conservative overall.
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Appendix D. Placebo tests
D.1 Residual waste
To test the reliability of our difference-in-differences estimates in Table 3 of the main text,
we perform a series of placebo regressions where we counterfactually assume that treatment
commenced at some point tp ≤ 0, i.e., within the actual pre-treatment period. Since each
such regression needs to include at least one period before as well as after the onset of the
placebo treatment, the first regression has tp = −24, yielding a total of 25 placebo regressions.
Each regression is run only on observations with t ≤ 0 and uses the specification




j + β3Aftert ∗ T 1j + β4Aftert ∗ T 2j + εijkt
where λkt is a set of block-by-period fixed effects, and δi are unit (address) fixed effects;
T 1j and T
2
j are not treatment variables but indicators of (eventual) treatment-group status,
such as monthly or quarterly feedback in Partille; and the dummy Aftert is equal to one
if t ≥ tp, and zero otherwise. It follows that placebo treatment effects are captured by
interactions Aftert ∗ T 1jt and Aftert ∗ T 2jt. If neither interaction-term parameter estimate is
significant, pre-treatment outcomes do not diverge significantly across treatments thoughout
t ≥ tp compared to t < tp. Further, if this is found to be the case generally for any tp, we
may conclude that pre-treatment trends are indeed parallel across all three treatment arms.
Figure D.1 reports the results of these tests by plotting, by municipality and treatment
arm, the full set of placebo treatment coefficients and associated confidence intervals. Note
that we are mainly interested in the placebo coefficients close to the middle of each panel of
Figure D.1. For those regressions, both the placebo pre-intervention and the placebo post-
intervention periods are relatively long. Thus, short-lived discrepancies between treatment
and control will get averaged out, as indeed they are in our main regression. On the sides,
by constrast, there is a danger of false positives because the number of pre or post periods
is small. For example, in early placebo regressions, coefficients may end up significant be-
cause the outcome variable happens to be unbalanced across the few placebo pre-periods;
but that significance may well disappear if more placebo pre-periods are added, reducing av-
erage treatment-control differences. A similar issue arises for late placebo regressions, where
estimates are likewise unreliable due to the limited number of post-intervention periods. Of
course, the choice of which placebo regressions to take seriously is arbitrary to an extent,
which is why we consistently report all placebo regressions.
In any case, among the 100 interactions estimated for residual waste, two are significant
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in Varberg (both relate to the dynamic treatment); and only one is significant in Partille
(p = 0.024). On the whole, we are satisfied that pre-treatment trends are sufficiently parallel,





























































Figure D.1: Placebo regressions: residual waste
D.2 Food waste
We now repeat the analysis for food waste. In Varberg, we find that a number of early
placebo dynamic-norm coefficients are significant; in Partille, the same is true for several late
treatment coefficients. For the reasons stated above, however, we are not convinced that these
findings should be interpreted as strong evidence that pre-treatment trends are generally
non-parallel in our data. As a further illustration of this point, note that averages for the
Varberg dynamic treatment in Figure 4 of the main text lie slightly below control averages
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throughout periods -17 to -12. Indeed, when all periods prior to period -17 are dropped
from the pre-experimental data used for placebo regressions, all dynamic-norm treatment
coefficients between periods -16 and -9 are found significant at the 5% level. Yet since
none of those coefficients are significant in Figure D.2, that significance appears spurious.

























































Figure D.2: Placebo regressions: food waste
34We have also tried dropping all periods prior to period -18 for the Varberg difference-in-differences
regressions in Table G.7. Estimated effects for the dynamic-norm treatment then become somewhat larger,
at about 0.035 kg/person.
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Appendix E. Regression discontinuity analysis
In this section, we perform regression-discontinuity (RD) analyses to estimate the causal
effect of a household receiving feedback showing it to lie below (or at) the overall waste
average among neighbors (’Good’ vs. ’Room for improvement’); or the waste-efficient average
(’Excellent’ vs. ’Good’). In each case, the running variable dit is the difference shown between
the relevant subpopulation average and a household’s own waste weight, so the RD treatment
applies to all observations with dit ≥ 0. Specifically, dit uses the distance shown in the last
feedback letter received by household i before and including period t.35
The key identifying assumption in an RD design is that potential outcomes are smooth,
or at least continuous, at the cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Then, units on either
side of the cutoff differ on average mostly with respect to discontinuous treatment status;
thus, in the limit, any average difference (discontinuity) in observed outcomes at the cutoff
may be taken as evidence of a causal effect from treatment. Figure E.1 checks for such
discontinuities by plotting the amount of residual waste collected from household i in period
t as a function of dit. While later formal RD analyses are based on the full data sets, the
figure restricts attention to observations in either municipality with −5 < dit < 5. The
resulting support of dit on either side of the cutoff is partitioned into a number of equal-
sized bins, and waste averages within each bin are represented as solid dots; 95% confidence
intervals are also shown in grey. The number and size of the bins are allowed to differ across
the cutoff, and are chosen to minimize the mean square error of the bin-average estimators,
integrated across the support of dit (Calonico et al., 2015). Finally, to smoothly represent
the conditional expectation function, we fit a quartic polynomial, shown as a solid line.
The relationship is clearly decreasing in both municipalities, reflecting serially correlated
waste behavior: for instance, households generating large amounts of waste in the comparison
period underlying dit (left part of figure) are likely to remain relatively high-waste households
in period t. In addition, the lines are very nearly linear. However, there is little evidence
of a discontinuity at zero, suggesting no causal effect of a household being given the rating
‘Good’ rather than ‘Room for improvement’. The exercise is then repeated for efficient-mean
distance, in Figure E.2. Again, the lines are largely downward sloping and linear, at least
35There are no own-household weights coinciding exactly with the overall mean, but a number of ob-
servations have exactly dit = 0 in relation to the efficient mean. Such households were indeed rated as
‘Excellent’ in the letters. Also, note that while outliers among own-household weights (>50 kg/person) were
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Figure E.2: Residual waste collected as function of running variable: distance to efficient
neighbor average
where there are a reasonable number of observations. In Varberg, there is some indication
of a small but precisely identified upward discontinuity at zero, suggesting that households
rated as ‘Excellent’ rather than ‘Good’ respond by subsequently generating more waste.
To rigorously evaluate potential discontinuities, we perform local linear regression using
only those observations that fall within a ’bandwidth’ range around the cutoff (Calonico
et al., 2017). We consistently use bandwidths that minimize the mean squared error (MSE)
of the local linear RD estimator. Moreover, we apply robust bias-corrected inference, first
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). Denoting bandwidths to the left and right of the cutoff
as h− and h+, respectively, our initial estimation imposes a uniform bandwidth h = h− =
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h+. However, the distribution of waste weights is strongly right-skewed, so our running
variables are similarly left-skewed. Thus, as a natural robustness test, we additionally allow
for different MSE-optimal bandwidths on either side, so h− 6= h+.
Results are given in Table E.1. All estimates are nonsignificant except for the Varberg
efficient-neighbor average, providing confirmation of the pattern noted in Figure E.2. The
coefficient is positive and, at about 0.2 kg/capita, of similar magnitude as the main treat-
ment effect presented in Table 2. No such discontinuity appears in Partille (or the similar
analysis of Allcott, 2011), so the evidence is not entirely clear-cut. The Varberg effect does
seem consistent with ‘moral licensing’: receiving explicit praise for one’s recycling behavior
may lead to a perverse response where such efforts are subsequently reduced. Similar be-
havioral patterns are documented in, for example, Khan and Dhar (2006), Sachdeva et al.
(2009), Mazar and Zhong (2010), and Gneezy et al. (2014); although we also note that the
replicability of this literature has recently been called into question (Blanken et al., 2014;
Urban et al., 2019).
24
Varberg Partille
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall avg. -0.002 -0.023 -0.054 -0.092
(0.051) (0.046) (0.076) (0.074)
Efficient avg. 0.209*** 0.189*** 0.011 0.034
(0.059) (0.045) (0.061) (0.060)
h− = h+ Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
h− 2.003 3.999 0.550 2.824 2.713 3.505 3.051 3.445
h+ 2.003 1.563 0.550 0.572 2.713 2.521 3.051 3.777
N− 20,373 34,125 10,637 53,811 6,881 8,242 15,227 16,699
N+ 29,621 22,366 10,420 10,785 11,311 10,349 7,796 8,134
Table presents robust bias-corrected regression-discontinuity estimates and standard errors,
corresponding to the overall average (one smiley; ’Good’) or the efficient-neighbor average
(two smileys; ’Excellent’). All effects are from left to right, i.e., from higher to lower own-
household weights. The (sharp) RD estimates use local linear regression (first-order poly-
nomials) around the relevant cutoff, with mean squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth(s).
h− and h+ are optimal bandwidths to the left and right of the cutoff, respectively; we either
impose uniform h− = h+, or allow h− 6= h+. Similarly, N− and N+ are effective obser-
vations on either side of the cutoff. Bias estimates are based on second-order polynomials.
Variance estimates are clustered at the cluster level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table E.1: Regression discontinuity estimates
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Appendix F. Calculating the marginal social cost of residual waste
In this section, we calculate the marginal social cost (MSC) of residual waste. We do
so under the assumption that each kilogram of residual waste causes a corresponding 750-
gram increase in packaging waste, and a 250-gram increase in sorted food waste. Thus, the
object of interest is the marginal change in the sum of internal and external costs as each
kilogram of residual waste is traded off against recycled material in this manner. Some of
the figures discussed below are direct estimates of cost differences measured across waste
fractions. Others are derived (by subtraction) from stand-alone cost estimates for single
waste fractions. Wherever possible, Swedish data are used.
Internal costs are financial costs from collection, transport, and disposal of waste, less any
revenues from recycled material. External costs arise due to environmental impacts from a
given waste fraction; recycling tends to reduce such impacts, yielding a (net) external benefit.
In line with Swedish waste policy, we assume that any waste not recycled is incinerated rather
than landfilled.
We calculate internal and external cost differentials, compared to residual waste, sepa-
rately for packaging and food waste. For packaging waste, our figures derive from Ambell
et al. (2010), a Swedish-language research paper also summarized in Finnveden et al. (2013).
This study compares internal and external costs under two scenarios for 2030: one where
Swedish waste management is characterized by “business as usual” (BAU), and one where all
packaging waste is recycled. The latter scenario thus involves substantial increases in recy-
cled packaging; the first row of Table F.1 reports the magnitudes. For calculating the MSC,
we will effectively assume that each 750-gram increase in recycled packaging is allocated
across packaging types in proportion to these figures.
The high-recycling scenario in Ambell et al. (2010) is estimated to entail 3800 SEK/-
tonne higher internal costs compared to the BAU scenario where more waste is incinerated.
After unit conversion, we obtain an estimate of the differential internal cost of packaging
recycling, equal to $0.45/kg.36 For external costs, we use data on six different environmental
impact categories considered by Ambell et al. (2010). Impacts per tonne of packaging type
is reproduced in the lower part of Table F.1. Weighting each environmental impact by the
top row of the table, we calculate per-tonne impacts from packaging waste as a whole. These
weighted averages are given in the last column of the table.
36We consistently use the exchange rate 1 USD = 8.38 SEK.
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Paper Glass Metal Plastic Weighted
avg., all
Reduction compared to BAU (tonne)a 1,386,000 91,000 264,000 980,000 N/A
Reduction of environmental impacts per tonne recyclable:b
Climate impact (kg CO2-eq.) 7.99 477 1,956 2,832 1,230
Photochemical oxidants (kg NMVOC-eq.) 2.15 2.00 8.24 6.09 4.15
Terrestrial acidification (kg SO2-eq.) 2.99 4.58 9.99 4.03 4.10
Freshwater eutrophication (kg P-eq.) 0.065 0.014 0.21 0.008 0.06
Marine eutrophication (kg N-eq.) 1.24 0.52 2.30 1.96 1.58
Depletion of abiotic resources (MJ) 22,047 9,217 29,594 32,909 26,262
a Source: Ambell et al. (2010), Table B2. b Compared to incineration. Source of impacts: Ambell
et al. (2010), Table B3.
Table F.1: Calculation of MSC of residual waste




Climate impact (kg CO2-eq.) 0.10 2
Photochemical oxidants (kg NMVOC-eq.) 3 8
Terrestrial acidification (kg SO2-eq.) 30 30
Freshwater eutrophication (kg P-eq.) 670 670
Marine eutrophication (kg N-eq.)a 12 12
Depletion of abiotic resources (MJ) 0.004 0.24
Ozone depletion (g CFC-11-eq.)a 1.2 1.2
Freshwater ecotoxicity (kg 1,4-DB-eq.)a 60.86 124.37
Marine ecotoxicity (kg 1,4-DB-eq.)a ≈ 0 0.606
Terrestrial ecotoxicity (kg 1,4-DB-eq.)a 176.47 176.47
Human toxicity (kg 1,4-DB-eq.) 0.004 12
a Uses Ecotax02 valuation set. Source: Ahlroth and Finnveden (2011).
Table F.2: Shadow prices of environmental impacts
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It remains to apply shadow prices to each environmental impact category, so as to obtain
external costs per tonne of packaging. We use two sets of prices, both reported in Ahlroth and
Finnveden (2011): Ecovalue08 and Ecotax02. The former set includes fewer environmental
categories and is used whenever available, with remaining prices taken from the latter set.
The relevant shadow prices are reproduced for convenience in Table F.2. Both sets include a
high and a low shadow price for most environmental impact categories, reflecting the range
of underlying valuation estimates.
External costs are then computed in Table F.3. The first column simply repeats each
environmental impact per tonne of packaging waste. Next, the second and third columns
monetize all impact categories (as SEK/tonne of packaging) using low and high environmen-
tal shadow prices, respectively. Finally, the bottom of the table reports summed external
costs per unit of packaging: $0.05 for low shadow prices, and $1.07 for high prices.
Ambell et al. (2010) does not consider increased recycling of food waste. To obtain
internal costs for that waste fraction, we turn to a report by the Swedish Waste Management
Association (2016), a stakeholder organization mainly representing municipalities and public
utilities. The report calculates per-tonne financial costs of waste management, net of revenue
from recycled materials, separately for food and residual waste. This is done for a range of
systems and municipality types. The values most applicable to Varberg and Partille (report
appendix 6, bottom table, column 2) are for a municipality without curbside collection,
with above-median population in urban centres (Varberg is in the 14th percentile nationally,
Partille in 20th percentile) and above-median share of apartment housing (Varberg is in the
29th percentile, Partille in 15th percentile). While considerable variation likely remains even
within this group of municipalities, we then estimate the food-residual cost differential at
3,500 SEK/ton, or $0.42/kg of food waste.
We have found no estimate of the external benefits of food-waste recycling (i.e., of anaer-
obic digestion compared to incineration) specific to Sweden. We therefore use a life cycle
analysis performed on UK data (Slorach et al., 2019) to calculate these benefits. The au-
thors consider a very wide range of environmental impact categories; we limit the analysis
to those impacts for which shadow prices are available in Ahlroth and Finnveden (2011).
Differential impacts per tonne of food waste, calculated as the difference between digestion
and incineration in Slorach et al. (2019), are reproduced in Table F.3, column 4. The fi-
nal two columns then monetize each impact using low and high shadow prices, respectively.
Note that digestion implies larger environmental impacts than incineration along some di-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ammonia when applying digestate to farmland. As a result, external benefits of food-waste
recycling are a negative -$0.01/kg when low shadow prices are used. For high shadow prices,
external benefits are $0.07/kg.
With these results, we are finally in a position to calculate the MSC per kilogram of
residual waste. Under low shadow prices, this is 0.75×(0.05−0.45)+0.25×(−0.01−0.42) =
−$0.41. High shadow prices instead imply 0.75× (1.07−0.45)+0.25× (0.07−0.42) = $0.38.
These are the values used to complete our cost-benefit analysis in the main text.
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Appendix G. Additional regression tables
Varberg Partille
(1) (2) (3)
Static (monthly) -0.277*** -0.309***
(0.032) (0.031)










Age of household head -0.005***
(0.001)
Male household head 0.038
(0.032)




p value, β1 = β2 0.791 0.944 0.004
Block by period FE Yes Yes Yes
Address dummies No No Yes
Observations 250,146 215,943 217,966
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.172 0.313
Table presents Cragg (1971) lognormal hurdle estimation of average treatment effects on log per-person
residual waste. We report unconditional marginal effects on the observed waste-weight variable, yit. In
all columns, block-by-period FE are included as dummies in the second-step equation, but we include
only block and period dummies (no interactions) in the first step estimating the probability of nonzero
weights. In the Partille regressions (columns 3 and 4), address dummies (‘fixed effects’) are included
in the second step to mimic our preferred difference-in-differences approach; note that the parameters
in the second step are equivalent to those of a log-linear OLS regression on observations where yit > 0.
We do not include address dummies in the first (probit) step, because this would lead to an incidental-
parameters problem where the number of parameters grows with the number of observations and esti-
mates are thus inconsistent. Head of household interpreted as oldest member of household. Variable
‘Recycling-station distance’ measured in km. In the hurdle regression, we cluster robust standard errors
at the cluster level. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the unconditional
option and reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.




Static (monthly) -0.220*** -0.273***
(0.033) (0.035)










Age of household head -0.002*
(0.001)
Male household head -0.010
(0.026)




p value, β1 = β2 0.599 0.720 0.627
Period FE Yes Yes Yes
Address FE No No Yes
Observations 250,146 215,943 217,966
R2 0.353 0.352 0.001 (within)
Table presents ANCOVA (Varberg) and difference-in-differences (Partille) estimates for aver-
age treatment effects on per-person residual waste. Head of household interpreted as oldest
member of household. Variable ‘Recycling-station distance’ measured in km. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.




Static (monthly) -0.221*** -0.217***
(0.026) (0.026)










Age of household head -0.003
(0.005)
Male household head 0.077
(0.120)




p value, β1 = β2 0.669 0.579 0.589
Block and period FE Yes Yes Yes
Address FE No No Yes
Observations 8,735 8,734 7,041
R2 0.422 0.424 0.006 (within)
Table presents ANCOVA (Varberg) and difference-in-differences (Partille) estimates for average
treatment effects on cluster-collapsed per-person residual waste. We collapse the data by cal-
culating cross-sectional cluster averages of (nonmissing) values of all variables. Note that, since
the number of addresses that we average over within each cluster may vary across time peri-
ods, these quantities will differ somewhat from the overall within-cluster average of each cluster
throughout the pre-intervention period. All regressions in the table include only block and period
FE; adding block-by-period interactions as well would imply very few observations per estimated
parameter. Head of household interpreted as oldest member of household. Variable ‘Recycling-
station distance’ measured in km. Robust standard errors clustered at the cluster level reported
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.









p value, β1 = β2 = β3 0.375




Table pools both municipalities into a single large data
set and presents corresponding difference-in-differences esti-
mates for average treatment effects on per-person residual
waste. The p value reported at the bottom of each col-
umn relates to an F test of the null hypothesis that all
three treatment coefficients are equal. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.




Static (monthly) -0.512*** -0.599***
(0.061) (0.065)










Age of household head -0.017***
(0.003)
Male household head -0.068
(0.062)




p value, β1 = β2 0.954 0.840 0.451
Period FE Yes Yes Yes
Address FE No No Yes
Observations 250,145 215,943 217,965
R2 0.502 0.517 0.001 (within)
Table presents ANCOVA (Varberg) and difference-in-differences (Partille) estimates for average
treatment effects on residual waste per household (address). Baseline averages are also in kg
per household. For comparison, the post-treatment control average of this variable is 8.83 kg/-
household in Varberg and 7.58 kg/household in Partille. Head of household interpreted as oldest
member of household. Variable ‘Recycling-station distance’ measured in km. Robust standard
errors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.




Static (monthly) -0.196*** -0.236***
(0.035) (0.036)
Static (monthly) × Rural -0.061 -0.079
(0.052) (0.056)
Dynamic (monthly) -0.260*** -0.308***
(0.038) (0.040)








Adjacent to control -0.029
(0.069)




Age of household head -0.003**
(0.001)
Male household head -0.008
(0.026)




Block and period FE Yes Yes Yes
Address FE No No Yes
Observations 250,146 215,943 217,965
R2 0.375 0.373 0.001 (within)
Table checks for spillovers between treatment and control groups in the context of ANCOVA (Varberg) and
difference-in-differences (Partille) regressions. ‘Rural’ and ‘Adjacent to control’ are both dummy variables.
Rural indicates whether the block that a household belongs to is urban (blocks 1-82) or rural (blocks 83-172).
Adjacent to control is equal to one for control households directly adjacent to a treated cluster; 597 house-
holds, 32% of the control group, were flagged in this fashion. Head of household interpreted as oldest member
of household. Variable ‘Recycling-station distance’ measured in km. Robust standard errors clustered at the
cluster level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.











p value, β1 = β2 0.919 0.034
Block by period FE Yes Yes




Within R2 0.000 0.000
For both municipalities, table presents regression difference-in-
differences estimates for average treatment effects on per-person
food waste, interpreted as a mechanism for residual-waste reduction.
WithinR2 relates to remaining variation after absorbing both address
and block-by-period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the cluster level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.





1 ≤ t ≤ 6 -0.135*** -0.172*** -0.203***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.039)
7 ≤ t ≤ 12 -0.216*** -0.267*** -0.295***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.042)
13 ≤ t ≤ 18 -0.261*** -0.313*** -0.279***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.046)
19 ≤ t ≤ 24 -0.244*** -0.297*** -0.299***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.045)
25 ≤ t ≤ 30 -0.244*** -0.301*** -0.265***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.047)
31 ≤ t ≤ 36 -0.256*** -0.318*** -0.324***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.059)
37 ≤ t ≤ 44 -0.184*** -0.253*** -0.283***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.053)
ATE, Treatment 2:
1 ≤ t ≤ 6 -0.157*** -0.199*** -0.136***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.039)
7 ≤ t ≤ 12 -0.243*** -0.295*** -0.221***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.043)
13 ≤ t ≤ 18 -0.296*** -0.355*** -0.189***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.047)
19 ≤ t ≤ 24 -0.283*** -0.337*** -0.209***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.045)
25 ≤ t ≤ 30 -0.235*** -0.274*** -0.187***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.045)
31 ≤ t ≤ 36 -0.250*** -0.288*** -0.251***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.058)
37 ≤ t ≤ 44 -0.166*** -0.219*** -0.229***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.051)
Baseline waste average 0.710*** 0.703***
(0.010) (0.0113)
Household-level controls No Yes No
Block by period FE Yes Yes Yes
Address FE No No Yes
Observations 649,085 560,463 359,258
R-squared 0.339 0.336 0.001
Table presents time-varying estimates for short-run and long-run average treatment effects on per-
person residual waste. Original post-intervention period covers period 1-18. ‘Treatment 1’ refers to
monthly static-norm feedback in both Varberg and Partille. ‘Treatment 2’ is monthly dynamic-norm
feedback in Varberg, and quarterly static-norm feedback in Partille. Within R2 relates to remaining
variation after absorbing both address and block-by-period fixed effects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the cluster level reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table G.8: Long-run effects of treatment
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